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ABSTRACT
As a mode of thought and information processing strategy, intuition can lead
people to behave ethically. However, very little is known about when intuition leads to
ethical outcomes and why. Drawing on research on prosociality, I argue that intuitive
decisions are generally more ethical than deliberative ones because people have a
s, which can be overcome by self-interested
deliberation. Drawing on research on framing, I argue that intuition is less likely to result
in ethical decisions under the condition of business framing because business framing
attenuates the effect of intuition on the concern for others s. I examine the
relationships among mode of thought (i.e., intuition vs. deliberation), framing of the
decision making context (i.e., business vs. nonbusiness)
a series of experiments. Data across these studies
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1CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION AND THEORETICAL BACKGROUND
Intuition plays an indispensable role in problem solving and decision making yet
it has not been given the credit that it deserves (Betsch, 2008; Dane & Pratt, 2007). Since
it arises from a rapid, nonconscious, and holistic process (Dane & Pratt, 2007), intuition
is commonly seen as a mode of thought that is devoid of deliberation or rational analysis
and therefore a source of bias that renders decision making prone to error, and that is
risky and unreliable (Kahneman, Slovic, & Tversky, 1982; Kahneman & Tversky, 2000;
McMackin & Slovic, 2000). Despite this critical view of intuition as an information
(Kahneman, 2003; 2011) and has been demonstrated to play an increasingly important
role in their organizational lives (Khatri & Ng, 2000; Perlow, Okhuysen, & Repenning,
2002; Weaver, Reynolds, & Brown, 2014). For instance, organizational members who
hold higher positions within an organizational hierarchy (e.g., executives) tend to rely
more heavily on their intuition when making strategic decisions (Khatri & Ng, 2000). In
addition, intuitive decisions have been shown to be superior to deliberative ones when
decision makers are experts in a particular domain (Dane, Rockmann, & Pratt, 2012;
Hammond, Hamm, Grassia, & Pearson, 1987) or when the decisions are complex (Mikels,
Maglio, Reed, & Kaplowitz, 2011).
2Intuition and deliberation also influence ethical decision making (Gunia, Wang,
Huang, Wang, & Murnighan, 2012; Zhong, 2011). The direction of these effects,
however, is still open to debate. Whereas some research indicates that slow, careful
contemplation (as opposed to immediate decision) leads to ethical outcomes (Gunia et al.,
2012), other research shows the opposite; that is, decision makers who rely on their
intuition in making decisions end up behaving more ethically than those who use
deliberation (Zhong, 2011). Drawing on research on prosociality, I argue that intuitive
decisions are generally more ethical than deliberative ones because people have a
s (Keltner, Kogan, Piff, & Saturn, 2014; Zaki &
Mitchell, 2013), which can be overcome by self-interested deliberation. Drawing on
research on framing, I argue that intuition is less likely to result in ethical decisions under
business framing because business framing attenuates the effect of intuition on the
s.
In the current chapter, I review the literature on intuition and its effects on
decision making, particularly ethical decision making, and develop three hypotheses
based on prior research. In the next chapter, I propose five studies to test these
hypotheses. The goal of this research is to make contributions to the literatures on
intuition and ethical decision making. First, by proposing the
, I intend to provide a
theoretical account of why intuition leads people to behave ethically. In doing so, I intend
to advance the existing knowledge of intuition and ethical decision making. Second, by
proposing business framing as a moderator of the effect of intuition in ethical decision
making, I intend to present a more balanced view that identifies a boundary condition for
3the potential benefit of intuition. I propose that even though intuition generally results in
ethical decisions, its positive effect may be attenuated when the decision making context
is framed as business related.
1.1 Dual-Processing Models of Decision Making
Some of the most influential frameworks for understanding the effects of intuition
on decision making are the dual processing models (Betsch, 2008; Dane & Pratt, 2007;
Epstein, 2010). The central tenet of these models is that human beings rely on two
independent systems for information processing, and both systems can influence decision
making processes and outcomes (Epstein, 2010; Sloman, 1996). The intuitive system is
evolutionarily old, rapid, automatic, effortless, and holistic, whereas the deliberative
system is evolutionarily young, slow, controlled, effortful, and analytic (Bargh, 1996;
Bargh & Chartrand, 1999; Dane & Pratt, 2007; Epstein, 2010; Hogarth, 2001; Kahneman,
2003; Sloman, 1996). While they generally agree that both systems play important roles
in decision making, scholars tend to disagree on the relative effectiveness of each mode
of thought (Betsch, 2008; Dane & Pratt, 2007; Epstein, 2010).
Research on judgment and decision making has demonstrated the pitfalls of
relying on intuition. For example, people often make erroneous estimates or reach
incorrect conclusions in math and probability tasks when they base their decisions on
their intuition or gut feelings (Kahneman et al., 1982; Kahneman & Tversky, 2000;
McMackin & Slovic, 2000). To many decision making theorists as well as lay decision
makers, the affective component of intuition is a major source of bias (see Damasio, 1994,
for an alternative point of view) that renders intuitive decision making prone to error,
4being more risky, and less reliable (Kahneman, 2011; Kahneman et al., 1982; McMackin
& Slovic, 2000).
Relatively recent work on intuition, however, paints a somewhat different picture
in the sense that intuition has been found to result in effective decisions when certain
conditions are met (Dane et al., 2012; Hammond et al., 1987; Mikels et al., 2011). For
instance, the nature of the tasks at hand may influence the effectiveness of intuitive
decisions. Dane and Pratt (2007) suggested that as a decision making technique, intuition
can help people make more effective decisions in tasks with less objective criteria for
decision evaluation, such as preference ratings (Wilson & Schooler, 1991), interpersonal
judgments (Ambady & Rosenthal, 1993), and moral judgments (Haidt, 2001). This is
because intuition allows people to approach the situation holistically through an
integration of different factors that may influence the effectiveness of a particular
decision (Dane & Pratt, 2007; Dane et al., 2012). For example, intuitive decisions have
been demonstrated to be more accurate in interpersonal judgment tasks, such as the
evaluation of teacher effectiveness based on a short, silent video clip, than deliberative
ones (Ambady, 2010; Ambady & Rosenthal, 1993). Ambady and Rosenthal (1993)
studied thin-
behavior, and found that participants who had to make intuitive judgments due to
cognitive load were much more accurate, as assessed by comparing each evaluation with
in their evaluations than those
who were instructed to take 1 minute to record as many reasons as possible before
making their ratings.
In addition, Mikels et al. (2011) demonstrated that intuitive decision making is
5effective for decisions that are complex. Participants who focused on their feelings about
decision options were more likely to arrive at effective decisions than those who paid
more attention to the details of the decision options when making complex decisions (e.g.,
choosing one of four cars with a variety of positive and negative attributes). Furthermore,
subsequent deliberation was shown to interfere with the positive effect of intuitive
information processing on decision quality (Mikels et al., 2011).
Intuition has also been demonstrated to be more advantageous to experts who
possess substantial domain knowledge and expertise (Dane et al., 2012; Salas, Rosen, &
DiazGranados, 2010). The idea is that experts in a given domain are able to draw on their
expertise and past experiences and process information quickly and efficiently and, as a
result, make effective decisions. Dane and colleagues (2012) found that a high level of
a set of operations
the quality of intuitive decisions. In one study, participants were asked to rate the
difficulty of basketball shots. Participants in the intuition condition were instructed to
rely on their intuition to make the ratings. In the analysis condition, participants were
asked to base their ratings on a careful analysis (Dane et al., 2012). Findings suggest that
in the intuition condition, participants with a high level of expertise in basketball
performed better than those with a low level of expertise, whereas domain expertise did
not affect performance in the analysis condition. The experts in the intuition condition
also performed better than those in the analysis condition, presumably because intuition
enabled the experts to simultaneously take into consideration different elements of the
task at hand and make a holistic assessment, whereas analysis, which tends to focus on
6formal rules in decision making, might have been less effective in a nondecomposable
task (Dane et al., 2012).
Research on the conditions under which intuition is used in decision making in
general is paralleled by the investigation of the role of intuition in moral judgment and
ethical decision making. Rationalist and intuitionist models offer competing
conceptualizations of the nature of moral judgment and ethical decision making (Haidt,
2001; Rest, 1986; Tenbrunsel & Smith-Crowe, 2008; Zhong, 2011). Next, I will review
these two kinds of models.
1.2 Rationalist Versus Intuitionist Models of Ethical Decision Making
As a testimony to the influence of the rationalist perspective in understanding the
nature of moral judgments and decisions, several rationalist models have been introduced
to account for the process of moral judgment and ethical decision making (Jones, 1991;
Kohlberg, 1969; Rest, 1986; Treviñ
moral development posits that people make moral judgments and decisions through a
slow, conscious, and effortful process in which they systematically apply moral
principles, carefully weigh the pros and cons of different options, and finally decide
which option to choose (Sonenshein, 2007; Zhong, 2011). A key assumption of
oral reasoning leads to the adoption of
universal principles and the promotion of general social welfare, which is implied as
more moral than other principles, such as obedience to authority (Kohlberg, 1969;
Lapsley, 2006; Narvaez, 2010). In other words, moral reasoning is essential in ensuring
7development.
Following Kohlberg, Rest (1986) proposed a multistage model of ethical decision
making in which moral awareness,
implications of the issue at hand, informs subsequent moral judgment, moral intention,
and behavior. In other words, recognizing moral relevance of the issue at hand triggers a
conscious reasoning process through which a judgment is then made and both
teleological and deontological considerations are taken into account (Hunt & Vitell,
1986). Treviñ - -
contingent model have also emphasized the primary role of deliberation in ethical
decision making and the ways in which individual and situational factors influence this
process. For example, Treviñ
moral development greatly influences his or her decisions such that more sophisticated
moral reasoning skills result in ethical decisions, such as helping a drugged student
(Kohlberg & Candee, 1984), and hinder unethical behaviors, such as cheating. Jones
(1991) synthesized the existing rationalist models on ethical decision making and
introduced the construct of moral intensity, -related moral
intensity elicit more sophisticated moral reasoning, which in turn is positively associated
with moral actions, such as resisting the temptation to cheat (Blasi, 1980).
Despite the dominance of the rationalist perspective in the conceptualization of
moral judgment and decision making (Tenbrunsel & Smith-Crowe, 2008; Zhong, 2011),
recent research in moral psychology and behavioral ethics has challenged this view and
offered an alternative that emphasizes the role of intuition in moral judgment and ethical
8decision making. As one of the most influential intuitionist models of moral judgment,
often a quick, automatic,
and effortless process. In this model, deliberation typically plays a peripheral (if any) role
and is understood to be mostly post hoc and used to justify a moral judgment that has
already been made. Sonenshein (2007) proposed a sensemaking intuition model of ethical
decision making in which issue construction and intuitive judgment both precede and
outweigh rational analysis, which typically serves the purpose of explaining or justifying
the intuitive judgments made by individuals facing ethical issues at work. Empirical
evidence shows that people indeed rationalize their intuitive decisions when they are
instructed to consider the rational reasons for their judgments or decisions. Pizarro,
Uhlmann, and Bloom (2003) examined how people attributed moral blame and praise
when the acts in question were causally ambiguous and found an effect of rationalization
after intuitive decisions. Participants attributed less blame to the protagonist in the
scenario only when their initial judgments were intuitive (as opposed to deliberative),
suggesting that participants engaged in rationalization only after they had relied on
intuition to ma
(Pizarro et al., 2003, p. 658).
To reconcile the rationalist and intuitionist perspectives, Monin, Pizarro, and Beer
(2007) suggested that the circumstances under which individuals make moral judgments
and decisions will influence the roles of intuition and deliberation. They posited that the
typically result in intuitive reactions.
Whether the hypothetical scenario involves two siblings engaging in consensual sex or a
9family eating its dead pet dog (Haidt, Koller, & Dias, 1993), individuals often react
quickly and negatively toward these moral transgressions, largely bypassing any rational
analysis. Haidt (2007) described this phenomenon as ing : people
know intuitively that something is wrong without being able to explain why. On the
contrary, individuals are more likely to rely on deliberation in situations where they
themselves have to make a difficult decision (e.g., resolving a moral dilemma) that might
have ethical implications. For example, people typically engage in deliberative decision
making when asked if they would smother their own crying baby to prevent enemy
soldiers from discovering and eventually killing them and other villagers (Monin et al.,
2007).
Assuming that individuals are capable of making either intuitive or deliberative
decisions, as suggested in dual-processing models, it remains unclear which mode of
thought (i.e., intuition versus deliberation) will increase
(Gunia et al., 2012; Wang et al., 2014; Zhong, 2011). In other words, the rationalist
(Jones, 1991; Kohlberg, 1969; Rest, 1986; Treviño, 1986) and intuitionist (Haidt, 2001;
Sonenshein, 2007) models of moral judgment and ethical decision making have primarily
focused on the descriptive aspect of moral judgment and decision making by offering
competing views on what people naturally do when making these judgments and
decisions. A key element that is missing from these models is the prescriptive aspect, that
is, what people should do (in terms of using intuition versus deliberation) when they
make moral ju
should s that individuals are
capable of overriding their initial, intuitive reactions by engaging in deliberation in moral
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judgment and decision making and that which mode of thought is eventually relied upon
could influence
In this dissertation, I investigate when intuition leads to ethical outcomes and why.
In the next section, I argue that intuition generally results in ethical decisions because
s, which can be overcome by self-
interested deliberation. Furthermore, I argue that intuition is less likely to result in ethical
decisions under the condition of business framing because business framing weakens the
s.
1.3
As a mode of thought, intuition plays an indispensable role in information
processing and decision making (Dane & Pratt, 2007). Of importance, intuition makes the
task of dealing with environmental stimuli manageable (Reynolds, 2006). Unlike the
slow and effortful deliberative system, the intuitive system enables individuals to process
and react to environmental stimuli quickly and efficiently without constantly exerting
conscious effort (Ambady, 2010; Bargh, 1996; Reynolds, 2006). According to Reynolds
(20 is quite cost efficient in the sense that it could be
exceptionally debilitating to process information related to all of the stimuli encountered
in a given day . In other words, the human brain cannot function properly
without the intuitive system because the stimuli individuals encounter on a daily basis
can easily overwhelm the deliberative system. As I will argue below, intuition also plays
an important role in the moral domain because it typically leads people to behave
ethically, whereas deliberation can tempt people into pursuing their self-interest at the
11
interests.
It has long been established that people engage in behaviors that benefit others,
even if doing so yields no immediate benefit (Axelrod & Hamilton, 1984; Bowles &
Gintis, 2011; Nowak & Sigmund, 2005; Penner, Dovidio, Piliavin, & Schroeder, 2005;
Tomasello, 2009). For example, people donate to charities (List, 2011), volunteer (Omoto,
Snyder, & Hackett, 2010), help a stranger on the street (Levine, 2003; Levine, Martinez,
Brase, & Sorenson, 1994), and cooperate with others in laboratory settings (Henrich et al.,
2004). Even infants and children demonstrate a tendency to help others in need (Bloom,
2013; Hamlin, Wynn, & Bloom, 2007; Warneken & Tomasello, 2006, 2007). For
instance, Warneken and Tomasello (2006) found that without any prompting, 18-month-
old infants helped the experimenter achieve his goal, such as getting an object that was
out of reach. Among various prosocial behaviors, what remains most puzzling is why
people would be kind and generous toward strangers (Keltner et al., 2014; Zaki &
Mitchell, 2013). In experimental games, it has been shown across studies that people tend
to offer a positive amount of their endowment to a stranger with whom they know they
will not interact again in the future (for a review, see Camerer, 2003).
One potential explanation for human prosociality is that though inherently self-
interested, people are capable of exerting self-control, which keeps the self-interested
impulse in check and propels them to act prosocially (Curry, Price, & Price, 2008;
Martinsson, Myrseth, & Wollbrant, 2012; Piovesan & Wengström, 2009). For instance,
Moore and Loewenstein (2004) asserted that to overcome the influence of their self-
interest, which is supposedly automatic and unconscious, people often have to engage in
a slow and thoughtful process, which then leads to the recognition of their responsibilities
12
for others. Self-control plays a critical role in this deliberative process in that it enables
people to resist the temptation to pursue their self-
interests (Martinsson et al., 2012). Building on findings that a lack of self-control can
negatively influence task performance and consumer behavior (Baumeister, 2002;
Baumeister, Bratslavsky, Muraven, & Tice, 1998), the self-control model of prosociality
assumes that prosocial behaviors are largely the outcomes of a battle that is won by a
slow and controlled process over impulses to serve our immediate self-interest (DeWall,
Baumeister, Gailliot, & Maner, 2008; Martinsson et al., 2012).
However, an emerging body of literature challenges this assumption and instead
supports an alternative theory that characterizes prosociality as an intuitive reaction that
does not require active self-control (Keltner et al., 2014; Zaki & Mitchell, 2013). For
instance, research that examines the link between decision speed and cooperation
indicates that quick decisions tend to be more cooperative than slow ones (Duffy & Smith,
2014; Kessler & Meier, 2014; Kieslich & Hilbig, 2014; Kinnunen & Windmann, 2013;
Nielsen, Tyran, & Wengström, 2014; Rand, Greene, & Nowak, 2012; Rand et al., 2014).
Rand and his colleagues found in a series of studies that individuals who decided quickly
in common dilemmas were more cooperative than those who made slow and rational
decisions (Rand et al., 2012). For instance, participants in one of the studies played a one-
shot public goods game in groups of four. Participants were given 40 cents and asked to
indicate how much they would like to contribute to a common pool. Any amount they
contributed to the common pool would then be doubled and distributed evenly among the
four players in the group, thus giving each of them a chance to free ride. Results showed
that individuals who made fast and intuitive decisions contributed more to the common
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pool than those who made slow and deliberative decisions (Rand et al., 2012). In addition
to this correlational evidence, Rand and his colleagues also established a causal link
between intuition and cooperation. Specifically, participants who were forced to make
quick and intuitive decisions through time pressure contributed a larger amount of money
to the common pool than those who made slow and deliberative decisions (Rand et al.,
2012).
findings (Tinghog et al., 2012; Verkoeijen & Bouwmeester, 2014), research in the past
several years has provided empirical support for intuitive prosociality (Cone & Rand,
2014; Duffy & Smith, 2014; Kessler & Meier, 2014; Kieslich & Hilbig, 2014; Kinnunen
& Windmann, 2013; Nielsen et al., 2014; Rand & Epstein, 2014; Rand & Kraft-Todd,
2014; Rand, Newman, & Wurzbacher, 2014). Most notably, experimental manipulations
exert self-control, such as increasing the cognitive load and time pressure, have been
shown to result in cooperation and prosocial behaviors (Cappelletti, Goth, & Ploner, 2011;
Cornelissen, Dewitte, & Warlop, 2011; Cone & Rand, 2014; Duffy & Smith, 2014;
Kessler & Meier, 2014; Kieslich & Hilbig, 2014). Duffy and Smith (2014) found that
participants who were in the high cognitive load condition (i.e., given a seven-digit
than those in the low cognitive load condition (i.e., given a two-digit number to recall).
The authors also found evidence that participants in the low cognitive load condition,
who were more able to deliberate on their choice because their cognitive resources were
mostly intact, engaged in more strategic decision making (i.e., basing their decisions on
14
the outcomes of previous rounds) than those in the high cognitive load condition (Duffy
& Smith, 2014). This finding suggests that intuition may be to cooperate
with others, but deliberation can override such intuition and instead lead them to make
contingent decisions that are noncooperative.
The assertion that intuition can result in prosocial behaviors is also supported by
research on the positive effects of disinhibition on prosocial behaviors (Lind & Van den
Bos, 2013; Van den Bos & Lind, 2013). Calling into question the assumption that people
are inclined to pursue their self-interest, scholars in this line of research make the
opposite prediction and find evidence that most people have prosocial preferences
(Balliet, Parks, & Joireman, 2009; Van Lange, 1999; Van Lange, Otten, De Bruin, &
Joireman, 1997) and are more likely to engage in prosocial behaviors when they do not
focus on how others might evaluate them (Van den Bos, Muller, & Damen, 2011; Van
den Bos, Muller, & Van Bussel, 2009; Van den Bos et al., 2011). For instance, after
being prompted to think of a situation in which they acted without caring about how
others might evaluate their actions, participants were both more likely to help another in
need (e.g., pick up the pens dropped by the confederate) and quicker to render needed
help (e.g., attend to a student who seems to be choking) despite the presence of
bystanders who failed to help (Van den Bos et al., 2009). This finding suggests that the
bystander effect
bystanders also do not offer help (Darley & Latane, 1968; Latane & Nida, 1981), may be
overcome when disinhibition enables people to follow their intuition to engage in
prosocial behaviors.
Together, recent research on cooperation and other prosocial behaviors largely
15
supports the positive link between intuition and prosociality (Keltner et al., 2014; Zaki &
Mitchell, 2013). Instead of being cold and self-interested, as assumed by the self-control
model of prosociality, human nature has been demonstrated to be much more tender and
prosocial to the point where people are intuitively biased toward prosociality (Keltner et
al., 2014). This tendency to be nice, generous, and helpful toward others, even strangers,
is likely to have its roots in evolution given the findings in developmental psychology
that infants show prosocial preferences and behaviors before their ability for self-control
is developed (Hamlin et al., 2007; Warneken & Tomasello, 2006, 2007). In addition,
findings in neuroscience that prosocial behaviors are associated less with the brain
regions that typically govern reflective and controlled processes (e.g., lateral prefrontal
cortex) and more with the regions that are more involved in reflexive and automatic
processes (e.g., ventral striatum) lend more support for intuitive prosociality (Zaki &
Mitchell, 2013).
In the behavioral ethics literature, recent research has also started to investigate
the link between mode of thought
findings, however, have been inconsistent. Zhong (2011) investigated the effects of
deliberation and intuition on ethical decision making. Participants engaged in a one-shot
deception game (Gneezy, 2005); they could send a truthful message to their interaction
partner (and keep less money for themselves) or lie (and keep more money for
themselves). In one study, participants in the deliberation condition solved five math
problems to activate a deliberative mindset, whereas those in the intuition condition
answered five questions about their feelings to activate an intuitive mindset. In another
study, participants in the deliberation condition read instructions that framed their choice
16
as a decision and were asked to indicate which message they decided to send, whereas
those in the intuition condition read instructions that framed their choice as an intuitive
reaction and were asked to indicate which message they felt like sending. Compared to
those in the intuition conditions, participants in the deliberation conditions were more
likely to lie to their interaction partner and keep more money for themselves (Zhong,
2011).
However, Gunia and colleagues (2012) found opposing evidence regarding the
effects of deliberation. In the context of the same one-shot deception game used in Zhong
(2011), they manipulated deliberation by instructing the participants to think very
carefully about which message to send for 3 minutes. Their findings indicated that
compared to the condition in which participants received no instruction prior to making
their decisions, fewer participants in the deliberation condition lied to their interaction
partner (Gunia et al., 2012). Interestingly, Moore and Tenbrunsel (2014) work calls
these findings into question. They examined the relationship between cognitive
Differently from Gunia and colleagues and
similarly , they found that high cognitive complexity (i.e., high
deliberation) led to more unethical decisions, though they also found that low cognitive
complexity (i.e., low deliberation) resulted in more unethical decisions as well. However,
it is important to note that Gunia and colleagues and Moore and Tenbrunsel did not study
intuition. Therefore, these findings do not speak to the effects of intuition. These mixed
results warrant more research on the effects of intuition (and deliberation) on ethical
decision making.
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Despite the inconsistency in the findings in the behavioral ethics literature, I argue
that ethicality, much like prosociality (Haidt, 2011; Rai & Fiske, 2011), is also largely
intuitive such that intuition typically leads to ethical outcomes, whereas deliberation
tends to result in unethical outcomes. Building on previous work in both moral
psychology and behavioral ethics (Bazerman & Gino, 2012; Jones, 1991; Treviño,
Weaver, & Reynolds, 2006), I define ethical decisions and behaviors as ones that adhere
to widely held societal norms. Based on this definition, lying, cheating, and stealing are
all considered unethical. Similar to engaging in prosocial behaviors, such as cooperation,
undertaking ethical behaviors may also -
interests.
For instance, when people face a situation in which lying enhances their self-
s and telling the truth does the opposite, intuition
s as opposed to their self-interest. This is
s is spontaneous (Keltner et al., 2014; Zaki
& Mitchell, 2013), whereas the concern for their self-interest may manifest itself when
their intuition is inhibited (Lind & Van den Bos, 2013; Van den Bos & Lind, 2013).
Intuition is likely to lead people to automatically and unconsciously follow the path that
s, regardless of the consequences for their self-interest. It is
entirely plausible that within the split second of intuitive decision making, the concern for
self-
Deliberation, on the other hand, can lead to unethical decisions and behaviors at
least in part because the deliberative process tends to interfere with the positive influence
-interest (Zhong, 2011). For instance,
18
one may deliberate and decide that monetary payoff should be the basis for the decision
-interest, becomes
salient because the deliberative process is likely to highlight specific aspects of the
decision making protected and this
interaction was one-shot instead of recurring). In other words, deliberation can interfere
to act ethically by making salient situational factors that one could
potentially take advantage of to advance -interest.
In summary, converging evidence indicates that intuition tends to result in
prosociality, whereas deliberation can hinder it (Keltner et al., 2014; Zaki & Mitchell,
2013). The spontaneous conce s, which underlies intuitive
prosociality, can also lead individuals to behave ethically. On the contrary, deliberation
tends to result in unethical outcomes because it can make their self-interest salient. Thus,
Hypotheses 1 and 2 are as follows:
1. Intuitive decisions and behaviors are more ethical than deliberative ones (H1).
2. s mediates the relationship between intuition and
such that intuition results in the concern for
s, which results in ethical decisions (H2).
Despite the general tendency of intuition to result in ethical decisions and
behaviors, it is important to acknowledge that intuition does not lead to ethical decisions
and behaviors under all circumstances. For instance, some research in behavioral ethics
shows that intuition can result in unethical outcomes (Gunia et al., 2012; Shalvi et al.,
2012). Next, I will argue that intuition is less likely to result in ethical decisions and
behaviors under the condition of business framing because business framing attenuates
19
s. Even though framing has been
used in the literature to denote both the way in which information about a problem or
situation is presented to a decision maker (Bazerman, 1994; Butterfield, Treviño, &
Weaver, 2000) and the conception of a problem, situation, or decision by a decision
maker (Tenbrunsel & Messick, 1999; Tversky & Kahneman, 1981), I focus exclusively
on the former. Given this focus, I define business framing as the presentation or labeling
of a decision making context as primarily related to business.
It has long been established that people make judgments and decisions in part
based on how a situation or context is framed (Deutsch, 1958; Ellingsen, Johannesson,
Mollerstrom, & Munkhammar, 2012; Engel & Rand, 2014; Kuhberger, 1998; Rai &
Fiske, 2011; Tversky & Kahneman, 1981). In a meta-analysis of more than 100 empirical
papers, Kuhberger (1998) concluded that the effects of gain-loss framing on decisions are
robust: people are risk averse when the outcome of a problem is framed as a gain and risk
seeking when the outcome of the identical problem is framed as a loss. In addition to the
effects of gain-loss framing, which originates from prospect theory (Kahneman &
Tversky, 1979), research in the framing literature indicates that giving a situation or
Batson &
Moran, 1999; Diener, Dineen, Endresen, Beaman, & Fraser, 1975; Kay & Ross, 2003;
Liberman, Samuels, & Ross, 2004; Pillutla & Chen, 1999). For instance, Diener and
colleagues (1975) found that participants engaged in more aggressive behaviors when a
role-playing exercise was labeled called
(Bandura et al., 1996).
Business framing has been shown to make people more competitive and less
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cooperative (Batson & Moran, 1999; Eiser & Bhavnani, 1974; Kay & Ross, 2003;
Liberman et al., 2004; Pillutla & Chen, 1999). For instance, Liberman and colleagues
(2004) found that participants were more likely to engage in competitive behaviors (i.e.,
def when the game was labeled
Two thirds of the participants playing the et
defected in the first round of the game, whereas only one third of the participants
playing the did so. The same pattern held for the remaining six
rounds of the game. This finding is consistent with the results from earlier research. For
instance, Pillutla and Chen (1999) found that people competed more in social dilemmas
that involved - . Moreover, people
lemma
The findings that business framing tends to result in competition and hinder
cooperation suggest that business is commonly associated with specific norms and
as social dilemmas (Kay & Ross, 2003; Kay, Wheeler, Bargh, & Ross, 2004; Reynolds,
Leavitt, & DeCelles, 2010). For instance, Reynolds and colleagues (2010) argued that
people typically view business as a generic concept that represents a specific set of
principles, which include competition and the maximization of profit. Similarly, Kay and
colleagues also identified competition and the pursuit of self-interest as the two most
common norms in business and found evidence that exposure to material objects that are
associated with business (e.g., briefcases) led to more competitive behaviors in social
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dilemmas (Kay et al., 2004). Just as business framing has been shown to elicit
competitive behaviors (Batson & Moran, 1999; Eiser & Bhavnani, 1974; Kay & Ross,
2003; Liberman et al., 2004; Pillutla & Chen, 1999) due to the presumed association
between business and competition, I argue that it can attenuate the effect of intuition on
the s because business is commonly associated with
moneymaking and the pursuit of self-interest (Ferraro, Pfeffer, & Sutton, 2005; Kay et al.,
2004; Miller, 1999; Reynolds et al., 2010).
As a symbol of the free-market capitalism and a primary goal for business
organizations (Caruso, Vohs, Baxter, & Waytz, 2013; Deflem, 2003; Kouchaki, Smith-
Crowe, Brief, & Sousa, 2013),
preferences, judgments, and behaviors (Caruso et al., 2013; Kouchaki et al., 2013; Vohs,
Mead, & Goode, 2006, 2008; Yang, Wu, Zhou, Mead, Vohs, & Baumeister, 2013). For
instance, when the concept of money is activated (e.g., through a descrambling task),
participants are less willing to help another individual, donate less to a university fund,
choose an individual-oriented activity (e.g., four personal cooking lessons) over a group-
oriented one (e.g., an in-home catered dinner for four), and prefer to sit farther away from
another participant (Vohs et al., 2006). In addition, Caruso and colleagues (2012) found
that subtle reminders of the concept of money led people to disregard the welfare of the
disadvantaged and favor the social systems that perpetuate social inequality. Most
relevant to the current research, Kouchaki and colleagues (2013) found that mere
exposure to the concept of money activated a business decision frame and resulted in
unethical behav They argued that
the pursuit of self-
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frame. argument that in
business it is typically assumed that people ought to focus on their self-interest as
opposed to their responsibility for others because all parties can take care of themselves
(Batson & Moran, 1999).
Together, this evidence provides support for a link between business framing and
an increased focus on self-interest. Business framing can activate a specific set of norms
and expectations, which include moneymaking and the pursuit of self-interest (Batson &
Moran, 1999; Kay et al., 2004; Reynolds et al., 2010). Once the pursuit of self-interest
becomes salient as a result of business framing, the effect of intuition on the concern for
s is attenuated because people are distracted by their self-interest in the
split second of intuitive
s (Keltner et al., 2014; Zaki & Mitchell, 2013) may be weaker under
the circumstance of business framing because people are now also influenced by their
self-interest (Ferraro et al., 2005; Miller, 1999). Thus, Hypothesis 3 is as follows:
3. Business framing moderates the relationship between intuition and the
s such that the effect of intuition on the concern for
interests is weaker under the condition of business framing and is less
likely to result in ethical decisions (H3).
In summary, I argue that intuitive decisions are generally more ethical than
interests. I
further argue that intuition is less likely to result in ethical decisions under business
framing because it s. In




In this chapter, I present a series of studies to test my model of intuition and
ethical decision making. I recruit participants from both an online participant pool (i.e.,
Amazon Mechanical Turk) and a participant pool consisting of undergraduate students
enrolled in business classes to increase the generalizability of potential findings. The
purpose of Studies 1a and 1b is to test the hypothesized main effect of intuition on the
-shot
deception game and a work-related scenario) in these studies, I intend to increase the
generalizability of potential findings. The purpose of Study 2 is to build on Study 1a and
Studies 3a and 3b is to test the hypothesized moderating effect of business framing on the
business framing on the relationship between intuit
interests. This is intended as a test of the first part of the moderated mediation model
the proposed mediator in the overall theoretical model.
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In Study 3b, I test the full model specified in Hypothesis 3 with the concern for
difficult to measure the mediator before the dependent variable. In fact, as I argued in the
previous section, an intuitive decision is usually made within a split second (see Haidt &
Joseph, 2004, for a discussion). This presents a challenge for conducting a mediation
analysis because temporal precedence is violated when the proposed mediator (i.e., the
. After weighing the pros (i.e.,
a better chance of capturing the intuitive decision making process) and cons (i.e., a
violation of the temporal precedence), I made the decision to follow previous published
research (Zhong, 2011) in measuring a proposed mediator after an intuitive decision is
made. Measuring the proposed mediator before the decision would likely present a more
serious problem because thinking about and then answering the questions about the
, or
deliberative. This was a difficult methodological decision to make, and I am fully aware
of the limitations of this approach.
2.1 Studies 1a and 1b
In Study 1a, I tested Hypothesis 1 using explicit instructions (Dane et al., 2012) to
manipulate intuition (vs. deliberation), and I measured the amount of time it took to make
intuitive (vs. deliberative) decisions so that I would be able to use the timing data to
inform the manipulation of intuition (vs. deliberation) in subsequent studies that use the
same experimental task. In Study 1b, I tested Hypothesis 1 using both explicit
instructions (Dane et al., 2012) and time pressure (Rand et al., 2012) to manipulate
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intuition (vs. deliberation). The combination of two methods was intended to strengthen
the manipulation of intuition (vs. deliberation). I also used a different experimental task
(i.e., a work-related scenario) to help increase the generalizability of potential findings.
2.1.1 Study 1a
2.1.1.1 Method
An a priori power analysis was performed using GPower 3.1 to estimate the
sample size. The following parameters were used in the calculation of sample size: effect
size (f) = .25, power = .8, and number of groups = 2. The sample size based on this power
analysis was 128. However, I recruited 15% more participants so that I could run the
analyses both with and without certain participants (e.g., those who did not pay enough
attention). The final sample size was 148. The same strategy was also used in subsequent
studies.
One hundred forty-eight adults were recruited through the Amazon Mechanical
Turk, an online participant pool (Buhrmester, Kwang, & Gosling, 2011), to participate in
this study for 50 cents (plus a bonus based on their decisions in the task). There were 63
women and 85 men, with a mean age of 35.82 (SD = 12.66). In terms of ethnicity, the
sample was 75% White/European American, 8.8% Asian/Asian American, 7.4%
Black/African American, 6.8% Latino/Hispanic, 0.7% Native American, and 1.4% other
ethnicities. At the time of the study, 75.7% of the participants were employed. One
hundred forty-eight participants (100%) speak English as their native language. One
hundred forty-seven participants (99.3%) are from the United States.
Participants were asked to complete a decision making task (see Appendix A),
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which involved choosing one of two messages to send to their partner in a one-shot
deception game (Gneezy, 2005). Participants were told that they had been randomly
paired up with another online participant. In this game, there were two roles: the Message
Sender, who would be given the two payoff options and asked to send one of two
messages, and the Decision Maker, who would receive a message about the payoff
options from the Message Sender and make a payoff decision. Option A stated $3 to the
Message Sender and $1 to the Decision Maker d $1 to the Message
Sender and $3 to the Decision Maker ere told that they had been
randomly assigned to one of the two roles, but they were always assigned to the Message
Sender role.
After reading the role instructions, participants were asked to send the Decision
Maker a message explaining the two payoff options. They were told that only they had
the payoff information and that they could send one of the following two messages.
Message 1 stated
stated was set up
such that the participants would earn $3 and the Decision Maker would earn $1, sending
Message 1 to the Decision Maker constituted a lie. By lying to the Decision Maker,
participants would earn $3 instead of $1.
Before they sent their message to the Decision Maker, participants read different
instructions based on the condition to which they were randomly assigned (see Appendix
A). In the intuition condition, participants read the following instruction: Base your
decisions entirely on your intuition or first impression, and avoid thinking very hard
(Dane et al., 2012). In the deliberation condition, participants read the following
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instruction, Base your decision on a very careful analysis and ignore any first impression
or gut instinct that might arise (Dane et al., 2012). The amount of time participants spent
in making their decisions (i.e., how long it took them to send one of the two messages)
was recorded. On average, it took participants in the intuition condition 12.6 seconds (SD
= 10.6) and participants in the deliberation condition 15.0 seconds (SD = 10.7) to make
their decisions.
The dependent variable was whether participants chose to lie (i.e., send Message
1) to the Decision Maker. After making their decisions, participants answered questions
about the task (see Appendix A), other measures (see Appendix B), and demographics
questions (see Appendix C). For instance, participants were asked to indicate their levels
When deciding which message to
send, I expected t Sending the false message to the
Decision Maker is an explicit lie Sending the false message to the Decision
Maker is unethical rch indicates that
-shot deception game
(Gunia et al., 2012; Zhong, 2011) regardless of the experimental condition (i.e., intuition
vs. deliberation) and therefore need to be controlled for if they are significantly correlated
Similarly, individual differences including moral identity and the propensity to
morally disengage
decision making (Aquino & Reed, 2002; Moore, Detert, Treviño, Baker, & Mayer, 2012)
and are therefore measured for exploratory purposes (e.g., to potentially be controlled for
in the analyses and to examine their potential moderating roles). In addition, I measured
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people differ in their preferred mode of thought when making decisions (Epstein, Pacini,
Denes-Raj, & Heier, 1996). The same strategy for measuring additional variables was
also used in subsequent studies except for Study 3c. The scales for these variables are
provided in Appendix B. After completing the study, participants were paid consistently
with the message that they sent to the Decision Maker (as if the Decision Maker accepted
their message as true).
2.1.1.2 Results and Discussion
In the task, I asked the participants to confirm the role to which they were
assigned, to indicate how much money they would earn if the decision maker believed
them, to report whether they had done the exact decision making task before, to indicate
what they thought the purpose of the study was, and to answer two attention check
questions so that I could run the analyses both with and without those who did not pay
enough attention, had done the exact decision making task before, and/or guessed the
purpose of the study. The data indicate that two participants (1.4%) did not select
Message Sender as their role in the task, 21 participants (14.2%) did not identify the
correct amount of money they would earn in the task, eight participants (5.4%) had done
the exact task before, no participants correctly guessed the purpose of the study, seven
participants (4.7%) did not answer the first attention-check question correctly, and all
participants answered the second attention-check question correctly. Excluding these
participants both separately and together did not change the study results, so I report the
results for the full sample (n = 148).
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s to two open-ended questions. The first
question was about why participants chose to send the message they did. For those who
told the truth, many mentioned that they wanted to be honest and/or fair. For those who
lied, many said that they wanted to earn more money for themselves. The second
question was to ask whether participants had any comments. Most of the participants did
not have any comments. The same strategy was used in all subsequent studies except for
Studies 1b and 3c.
As a manipulation check, I first examined whether participants in the intuition
(deliberation) condition reported relying on intuition (deliberation) to make their
decisions more than those in the deliberation (intuition) condition. On average,
participants in the intuition condition (Mintuition = 4.82, SD = 1.72) agreed with the
I used intuition or gu
deliberation condition (Mdeliberation = 3.56, SD = 1.80), t(146) = 4.37, p = .000. On average,
participants in the deliberation condition (Mdeliberation = 5.13, SD = 1.45) agreed with the
I used a careful analysis to make my
condition (Mintuition = 4.47, SD = 1.55), t(146) = 2.71, p = .008. This suggests the
manipulation of intuition and deliberation was effective.
Descriptive statistics and correlations among study variables are listed in Table 1.
Forty-three participants (59%) in the intuition condition made an unethical decision; 42
participants (56%) in the deliberation condition made an unethical decision.
To test Hypothesis 1, that intuitive decisions and behaviors are more ethical than
deliberative ones, I conducted a binary logistic regression comparing mode of thought
(deliberation = 0, intuition = 1) as the independent variable and the
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decision as a dichotomous dependent variable (unethical = 0, ethical = 1). The effect was
not statistically significant, Exp(B) = .89, p = .72. To rule out the possibility that the
hypothesized effect was masked by other variables not specified in the theoretical model,
I ran the same analysis controlling for the study variables that correlate with the
dependent variable (i.e., Age, Employment, Believe, Lie, Unethical, Need for Cognition,
and Moral Disengagement). The effect was not statistically significant after controlling
for these variables, Exp(B) = 1.21, p = .64. This suggests that participants in the intuition
condition were as likely to lie to their counterpart in the decision making game as those in
the deliberation condition. Therefore, H1 was not supported by the data.
To explore the potential moderating effects of individual differences, I also ran
four different logistic regressions to examine whether each of the four individual
difference variables (i.e., Faith in Intuition, Need for Cognition, Moral Identity, and
Moral Disengagement) interacts with mode of thought (i.e., intuition vs. deliberation) to
None of the interactions were statistically
significant, Exp(B)s = .78, 1.41, 1.14, and 1.70, and ps = .39, .17, .72, and .14,
respectively. In the next study, I proposed to test H1 by using a different experimental
task (i.e., a work-related scenario). The purpose of this study was to examine whether the
hypothesized effect might manifest itself under a different decision making context.
2.1.2 Study 1b
2.1.2.1 Method
An a priori power analysis was performed using GPower 3.1 to estimate the
sample size. The following parameters were used in the calculation of sample size: effect
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size (f) = .25, power = .8, and number of groups = 2. The sample size based on this power
analysis was 128. I recruited 15% more participants for the same reason I did in Study 1a.
The final sample size was 148.
One hundred forty-eight adults were recruited through the Amazon Mechanical
Turk, an online participant pool (Buhrmester et al., 2011), to participate in this study for
1 dollar. There were 58 women and 90 men, with a mean age of 31.76 (SD = 8.92). In
terms of ethnicity, the sample was 75% White/European American, 9.5% Asian/Asian
American, 6.8% Black/African American, 5.4% Latino/Hispanic, 0.7% Native American,
and 2.7% other ethnicities. At the time of the study, 81.8% of the participants were
employed. One hundred forty-eight participants (100%) speak English as their native
language. One hundred forty-six participants (98.6%) are from the United States.
Participants were asked to read a hiring scenario (adapted from Kouchaki et al.,
2013), take the perspective of the main character in the scenario, and make a decision
(see Appendix D). In this scenario, participants were instructed to assume the role of the
managing director of a company, who was responsible for recruiting a new assistant
marketing manager. In addition, they were told that toward the end of the interview, the
job candidate implied that if hired, he can provide confidential information about the
ain competitor. Next, they were asked to indicate the likelihood that they
would hire this job candidate.
Before they made their decisions, participants read different instructions based on
the condition (i.e., intuition vs. deliberation) to which they were randomly assigned (see
Appendix D). In the intuition condition, participants read the following instruction: Base
your decision entirely on your intuition or first impression, and avoid thinking very hard.
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You must make your decision in less than 9 seconds (Dane et al., 2012; Rand et al.,
2012). In the deliberation condition, participants read the following instruction: Base
your decision on a very careful analysis and ignore any first impression or gut instinct
that might arise. You must wait and think for at least 20 seconds before making your
decision . ed on the screen only after 20 seconds had passed
(Dane et al., 2012; Rand et al., 2012). Both 9 seconds in the intuition condition and 20
seconds in the deliberation condition were determined based on the timing data that I
collected in a small sample (n = 60) through the same online participant pool (i.e.,
Amazon Mechanical Turk), using the same manipulations of intuition and deliberation as
Study 1a. The goal of adding a time pressure element was to strengthen the manipulation
of intuition. Using a different experimental task was intended to increase the
generalizability of potential findings.
The dependent variable was the likelihood that participants would hire the job
candidate. After making their decisions, participants answered questions about the task
(see Appendix D), other measures (see Appendix B), and demographics questions (see
Appendix C). Like in Study 1a, I measured these variables because of the potential need
to control for them in the analyses and to examine their potential moderating roles.
2.1.2.2 Results and Discussion
In the task, I asked the participants to indicate what they thought the purpose of
the study was and answer two attention-check questions so that I could run the analyses
both with and without those who did not pay enough attention and/or guessed the purpose
of the study. The data indicate that no participants guessed the purpose of the study and
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nine participants (6.1%) did not answer the first attention-check question correctly, and
all participants answered the second attention-check question correctly. Excluding the
participants based on the first attention check question did not change the study results,
so I report the results for the full sample (n = 148).
As a manipulation check, I first examined whether participants in the intuition
(deliberation) condition reported relying on intuition (deliberation) to make their
decisions more than those in the deliberation (intuition) condition. On average,
participants in the intuition condition (Mintuition = 5.49, SD = 1.46) agreed with the
I used intuition or gu the
deliberation condition (Mdeliberation = 3.19, SD = 1.93), t(146) = 8.21, p = .000. On average,
participants in the deliberation condition (Mdeliberation = 5.73, SD = 1.21) agreed with the
I used a caref han those in the intuition
condition (Mintuition = 3.99, SD = 1.80), t(146) = 6.90, p = .000. This suggests the
manipulation of intuition and deliberation was effective.
Descriptive statistics and correlations among study variables are listed in Table 2.
To test Hypothesis 1, that intuitive decisions and behaviors are more ethical than
deliberative ones, I conducted an independent-samples t-test comparing mode of thought
(deliberation = 1, intuition = -1) as the independent variable and the likelihood of making
an unethical decision (i.e., hiring the job candidate) as a continuous dependent variable
(ranging from 1 = not likely at all to 7 = very likely). There was no statistically
significant difference in the likelihood to hire the job candidate between the intuition
condition (Mintuition = 3.21, SD = 1.75) and the deliberation condition (Mdeliberation = 3.01,
SD = 1.57), t(146) = 0.73, p = .47. To rule out the possibility that the hypothesized effect
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was masked by other variables not specified in the theoretical model, I also ran a
regression analysis controlling for the variables that correlate with the dependent variable
(i.e., Age, Unethical, Need for Cognition, and Moral Disengagement). The effect was not
statistically significant, B = -.04, t = -.33, p = .75. This suggests that participants in the
intuition condition were as likely to make an unethical decision in a scenario-based
setting as those in the deliberation condition. Therefore, H1 was not supported by the data.
As I did in Study 1a for exploratory purposes, I also ran four different regressions
to examine whether each of the four individual difference variables (i.e., Faith in Intuition,
Need for Cognition, Moral Identity, and Moral Disengagement) interacts with mode of
thought (i.e., intuition vs. deliberation) to affect the likelihood to hire the job candidate.
The first three interactions were not statistically significant, Bs = .17, -.03, and .21, ts =
1.66, -.32, and 1.31, and ps = .10, .75, and .19, respectively. The interaction of mode of
thought and moral disengagement was statistically significant, B = -.25, t = -2.05, p =
0.04, suggesting that those who are low (high) in the propensity to morally disengage
were more likely to make an ethical decision when using intuition (deliberation) than
when using deliberation (intuition).
Based on research on intuition and prosociality (Rand et al., 2012) and intuition
and ethics (Zhong, 2011), I theorized that intuitive decisions are more ethical than
deliberative ones (H1). Acknowledging the mixed findings in the literature regarding
mode of thought and ethical decision making (Gunia et al., 2012; Moore & Tenbrunsel,
2014), I also predicted that the hypothesized effect of intuition on ethical decision making
is likely moderated by framing, which is a contextual variable (H3). This incidental
finding is potentially theoretically interesting because it suggests that the relationship
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between mode of thought (i.e., intuition vs. del
decisions may depend on an individual difference variable. The inconsistent findings in
the literature suggest that the relationship between mode of thought and ethical decision
making is likely complex, and this incidental finding potentially offers a new direction in
examining this relationship (i.e., theorizing the potential moderating roles of individual
differences). So far, I found a moderating effect of the propensity to morally disengage in
this study but not in Study 1a, and I test the relationship between mode of thought, the
studies.
2.2 Study 2
As tests of Hypothesis 1, that intuitive decisions are more ethical than deliberative
ones, Studies 1a and 1b did not provide empirical support for my prediction. One
potential explanation for the nonsignificant results for the hypothesized main effect is that
an indirect effect of the independent variable on the dependent variable may exist through
a third variable (Collins, Graham, & Flaherty, 1998; Shrout & Bolger, 2002). For
instance, MacKinnon and Fairchild (2009) discussed the possibility of a mediating effect
masking a main effect of an independent variable on the dependent variable because the
sign of the mediating effect may differ from the sign of the direct effect. Drawing on
research on prosociality (Keltner et al., 2014; Zaki & Mitchell, 2013), I have argued that
intuitive decisions may be more ethical than deliberative ones because people have a
may be the third variable and have a mediating effect in intuitive ethical decision making.
36
In Study 2, I tested this possibility by using the same experimental task in Study 1a but a
different method for manipulating intuition (vs. deliberation). Specifically, I combined
both explicit instruction (Dane et al., 2012) and time pressure (Rand et al., 2012) in order
to strengthen the manipulation of intuition (vs. deliberation). Furthermore, I tested two
possible indirect effects of the concern for self and emotion because previous research
had suggested both as potential mediators for a hypothesized relationship between
2.2.1 Method
An a priori power analysis was performed using GPower 3.1 to estimate the
sample size. The following parameters were used in the calculation of sample size: effect
size (f) = .25, power = .8, and number of groups = 2. The sample size based on this power
analysis was 128. I recruited 15% more participants for the same reason I did in Studies
1a and 1b. The final sample size was 149.
One hundred forty-nine adults were recruited through the Amazon Mechanical
Turk, an online participant pool (Buhrmester et al., 2011), to participate in this study for
50 cents (plus a bonus based on their decisions in the task). There were 53 women and 96
men, with a mean age of 33.64 (SD = 9.84). In terms of ethnicity, the sample was 80.5%
White/European American, 11.4% Asian/Asian American, 2.7% Black/African American,
4.7% Latino/Hispanic, and 0.7% Native American. At the time of the study, 81.2% of the
participants were employed. One hundred forty-six participants (98%) speak English as
their native language. One hundred forty-nine participants (100%) are from the United
States.
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Participants were asked to complete the decision making task used in Study 1a
(see Appendix E). Participants were randomly assigned to one of two conditions (i.e.,
intuition vs. deliberation). In the intuition condition, participants read the following
instruction: Base your decision entirely on your intuition or first impression, and avoid
thinking very hard. You must make your decision in less than 12 seconds (Dane et al.,
2012; Rand et al., 2012). In the deliberation condition, participants read the following
instruction: Base your decision on a very careful analysis and ignore any first
impression or gut instinct that might arise. You must wait and think for at least 15
seco (see Appendix E) ared on
the screen after 15 seconds had passed (Dane et al., 2012; Rand et al., 2012). Both 12
seconds in the intuition condition and 15 seconds in the deliberation condition were
determined based on the timing data collected in Study 1a (after excluding one extreme
case in the intuition condition).
The dependent variable was whether participants chose to lie (i.e., send Message
1) to the Decision Maker as
assessed through the four items that measured
interest (see Appendix E). In addition, I used items from previous research (Zhong, 2011)
to test whether alternative mechanisms (i.e., emotion and the concern for self) might
account for a hypothesized (see
Appendix E). Because intuitive decision making is quick, it is difficult to measure the
mediator before the dependent variable. Therefore, in this study, I measured the concern
after the decision of whether to lie to the Decision Maker, which was
the dependent variable. As I explained at the beginning of the method section, I made the
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decision to follow previously published research (Zhong, 2011) in measuring a proposed
mediator after an intuitive decision is made.
After completing the task and th interests measure,
participants answered questions about the task (see Appendix E), other measures (see
Appendix B), and demographics questions (see Appendix C). Like in Study 1a,
participants were asked to respond to the following statements: When deciding which
message to send, I expected t Sending the false
message to the Decision Maker is an explicit lie Sending the false message to
the Decision Maker is unethical
change the results in Study 1a, it made sense to measure them in this study and
potentially control for them in the analyses, because previous research shows that these
-shot
deception game (Gunia et al., 2012; Zhong, 2011) regardless of the experimental
condition (i.e., intuition vs. deliberation).
2.2.2 Results and Discussion
In the task, I asked the participants to confirm the role to which they were
assigned, to indicate how much money they would earn if the decision maker believed
them, to indicate what they thought the purpose of the study was, and to answer three
attention-check questions so that I could run the analyses both with and without those
who did not pay enough attention and/or guessed the purpose of the study. The data
indicate that 6 participants (4%) did not select Message Sender as their role in the task,
17 participants (11.5%) did not identify the correct amount of money they would earn in
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the task, no participants guessed the purpose of the study, 5 participants (3.4%) did not
answer the first attention check question correctly, 5 participants (3.4%) did not answer
the second attention check question correctly, and all participants answered the third
attention check question correctly. Excluding these participants both separately and
together did not change the study results, so I report the results for the full sample (n =
149).
an open-ended question about why they
chose to send the message they did. Similar to Study 1a, for those who told the truth,
many said that they wanted to be honest and/or fair. For those who lied, many reported
that they wanted to maximize their own payment.
As a manipulation check, I first examined whether participants in the intuition
(deliberation) condition reported relying on intuition (deliberation) to make their
decisions more than those in the deliberation (intuition) condition. On average,
participants in the intuition condition (Mintuition = 4.82, SD = 1.72) agreed with the
I used intuition or gu
deliberation condition (Mdeliberation = 3.56, SD = 1.80), t(146) = 4.37, p = .000. On average,
participants in the deliberation condition (Mdeliberation = 5.13, SD = 1.45) agreed with the
statement I used a caref
condition (Mintuition = 4.47, SD = 1.55), t(146) = 2.71, p = .008. This suggests the
manipulation of intuition and deliberation was effective.
Descriptive statistics and correlations among study variables are listed in Table 3.
Forty-four participants (59%) in the intuition condition made an unethical decision; 32
participants (43%) in the deliberation condition made an unethical decision. The concern
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= .62). The
concern for the self was assessed through another set of four items ( = .88).
To test Hypothesis 2, I conducted a mediation analysis using a bootstrapping
approach (Preacher & Hayes, 2004). Specifically, employing the bootstrapping method
produced a confidence interval (CI) of [-.439, .033] for the indirect effect of mode of
s through the
s not statistically significant because
the CI includes zero (see Figure 1). Therefore, Hypothesis 2 was not supported.
To explore the potential moderating roles of individual differences, I also ran four
different logistic regressions to examine whether each of the four individual difference
variables (i.e., Faith in Intuition, Need for Cognition, Moral Identity, and Moral
Disengagement) interacts with mode of thought (i.e., intuition vs. deliberation) to affect
were statistically significant,
Exp(B)s = .96, 1.34, 1.68, and .69, and ps = .89, .26, .20, and .29, respectively.
B
decisions, and, from an empirical point of view, positively correlates with the ethicality
dichotomous dependent variable (unethical = 0, ethical = 1). The effect of the concern for
s was statistically significant, Exp(B) =
1.88, p = .000. This suggests that for a 1-
there was a 1.88 times increase in the odds of an ethical decision. Implications of this
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incidental yet potentially important finding are discussed in the general discussion section.
Additional mediation analyses using the same bootstrapping approach (Preacher & Hayes,
2004) suggest that neither concern for the self nor emotion mediated the relationship
between mode of s.
2.3 Studies 3a, 3b, and 3c
As a test of Hypothesis 2, Study 2 did not provide empirical support for my
prediction. One potential explanation for the nonsignificant results for the hypothesized
main effect and mediation effect is that the hypothesized relationships between intuition,
dependent upon the specific context in which a decision is made. The inconsistent
findings in the literature on intuition and ethical decision making (Gunia et al., 2012;
Zhong, 2011) in part reflect this complexity and likely context dependency. Drawing on
research on framing, I have argued that framing of the decision making scenario could
potentially moderate the hypothesized relationships between intuition, the concern for
In Study 3a, I tested this prediction.
As mentioned before, intuitive decision making is quick, making it difficult to measure
the mediator before the dependent variable (i.e., the decision). Therefore, I conducted
Study 3a to examine how intuition and business framing potentially influence the concern
, which is the proposed mediator in the theoretical model. In Study 3b,
I measured the mediator after the dependent variable and tested the full model specified
in Hypothesis 3. In Study 3c, I tested the full model in Hypothesis 3 using a different way




An a priori power analysis was performed using GPower 3.1 to estimate the
sample size. The following parameters were used in the calculation of sample size: effect
size (f) = .25, power = .8, numerator df = 1, and number of groups = 4. The sample size
based on this power analysis was 128. I recruited about 15% more participants for the
same reason I did in previous studies. The final sample size was 142.
One hundred forty-two undergraduate students enrolled in Management classes at
the University of Utah were recruited to participate in this study in exchange for partial
course credit (plus a cash payment based on their decisions in the task). There were 48
women and 94 men, with a mean age of 22.61 (SD = 3.24). In terms of ethnicity, the
sample was 66.2% White/European American, 21.8% Asian/Asian American, 0.7%
Black/African American, 5.6% Latino/Hispanic, and 5.6% other ethnicities. At the time
of the study, 63.4% of the participants were employed. One hundred and eight
participants (76.1%) speak English as their native language. One hundred and seven
participants (75.4%) are from the United States.
Participants were asked to complete the decision making task used in Study 1a
(see Appendix F). A 2 (mode of thought: intuition vs. deliberation) × 2 (framing:
business vs. nonbusiness) between-participants design was used in this study. Participants
were randomly assigned to one of four conditions. In the intuition condition, participants
read the following instruction: Base your decision entirely on your intuition or first
impression, and avoid thinking very hard (Dane et al., 2012). In the deliberation
condition, participants read the following instruction: Base your decision on a very
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careful analysis and ignore any first impression or gut instinct that might arise (see
Appendix F).
Framing (i.e., business vs. nonbusiness) was manipulated prior to the task (see
Appendix F). Participants in the business framing condition read the following instruction:
In this study you will be engaging in a business transaction with another participant
currently logged into the system. Please read the instructions carefully to ensure that you
understand how this business transaction works. ss
In this study you will be engaging in a social
exchange with another participant currently logged into the system. Please read the
instructions carefully to ensure that you understand how this social exchange works.
Before sending their message to the Decision Maker, participants responded to the four
items that measured F).
The dependent variable was Participants still
chose a message to send to the Decision Maker because their choice would determine
how much they got paid when the study was over. After completing the task and the
ed questions about the task (see
Appendix F), other measures (see Appendix B), and demographics questions (see
Appendix C). Like in Studies 1a and 2, participants were asked to indicate the extent to
which they thought that the Decision Maker would believe them, sending the false
message to the Decision Maker is an explicit lie, and sending the false message to the
Decision Maker is unethical. In addition, participants also answered questions about the
concern for self and about the role of emotion in the decision making task because
previous research had suggested that both might be affected by mode of thought (i.e.,
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(Zhong, 2011).
2.3.1.2 Results and Discussion
In the task, I asked the participants to confirm the role to which they were
assigned, to indicate how much money they would earn if the decision maker believed
them, to report whether they had done the exact decision making task before, to report
whether they had taken the management class before, to indicate what they thought the
purpose of the study was, and to answer two attention check questions so that I could run
the analyses both with and without those who did not pay enough attention, had done the
exact decision making task before, had taken the management class before, and/or
guessed the purpose of the study. The data indicate that 11 participants (7.7%) did not
select Message Sender as their role in the task, 14 participants (9.9%) did not identify the
correct amount of money they would earn in the task, 10 participants (7.0%) had done the
same task before, 48 (33.8%) had taken the management class before, no participants
guessed the purpose of the study, 19 participants (13.4%) did not answer the first
attention check question correctly, and 25 participants (17.6%) did not answer the second
attention check question correctly. Excluding these participants both separately and
together did not change the study results, so I report the results for the full sample (n =
142).
I also explore open-ended question about why they
chose to send the message they did. Similar to Studies 1a and 2, for those who told the
truth, many said that they wanted to be honest and did not want to lie. For those who lied,
45
many reported that they wanted to earn more money for themselves.
As a manipulation check, I first examined whether participants in the intuition
(deliberation) condition reported relying on intuition (deliberation) to make their
decisions more than those in the deliberation (intuition) condition. On average,
participants in the intuition condition (Mintuition = 5.09, SD = 1.28) agreed with the
I used intuition or gut instincts to make my
deliberation condition (Mdeliberation = 4.46, SD = 1.64), t(140) = 2.54, p = .012. On average,
participants in the deliberation condition (Mdeliberation = 5.46, SD = 1.11) agreed with the
I used a careful
condition (Mintuition = 4.53, SD = 1.61), t(140) = 4.01, p = .000. This suggests the
manipulation of intuition and deliberation was effective. Next, I examined whether
participants in the business framing (nonbusiness framing) condition reported (on a 7-
point scale) the decision making task to be a business transaction (social exchange) more
than those in the nonbusiness framing (business framing) condition. On average,
participants in the business framing condition (Mbusiness = 4.92, SD = 1.54) did not agree
those in the nonbusiness framing condition (Mnon-business = 5.06, SD = 1.54), t(140) = -.55,
p = .59. On average, participants in the nonbusiness framing condition (Mnon-business = 4.75,
SD
Mbusiness = 4.66, SD = 1.59),
t(140) = .32, p = .75. This suggests that the manipulation of business and nonbusiness
framing was not effective. Therefore, the results of this study need to be interpreted with
extreme caution.
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Descriptive statistics and correlations among study variables are listed in Table 4.
For those in the intuition condition, 22 participants (54%) exposed to a business framing
made an unethical decision and 19 participants (65%) exposed to a nonbusiness framing
made an unethical decision. For those in the deliberation condition, 12 participants (40%)
exposed to a business framing made an unethical decision and 19 participants (45%)
exposed to a nonbusiness framing made an unethical decision.
h a set of four
items ( = .70). The concern for the self was assessed through another set of four items (
= .79).
As a partial test of Hypothesis 3, that business framing interacts with intuition to
ed a regression analysis with mode of
thought (deliberation = 0, intuition = 1) as the independent variable, framing of the
decision making context as the moderator (business framing = 0, nonbusiness framing =
1 interest as a continuous dependent variable.
The overall model was not statistically significant, F(3, 138) = .08, p = .97. The main
interests was not statistically significant, B = .04, F(1, 138) = .08, p = .78. The main
not statistically significant, B = .01, F(1, 138) = .01, p = .93. The interaction also was not
statistically significant, B = -.14, t = -.39, p = .70.
To rule out the possibility that the hypothesized effect was masked by other
variables not specified in the theoretical model, I also ran the same analysis controlling
for the variables that correlate with the dependent variable (i.e., Self, Emotion, Lie, and
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Unethical), and the interaction was not statistically significant, B = -.05, t = -.16, p = .88.
as
predicted by mode of thought or the framing of the decision making context (see Table 5).
As I did in previous studies for exploratory purposes, I also ran four different
regressions to examine whether each of the four individual difference variables (i.e.,
Faith in Intuition, Need for Cognition, Moral Identity, and Moral Disengagement)
interacts with mode of thought (i.e., intuition vs. deliberation) to influence the concern
were statistically significant, Bs = .18, .08, -
.14, and -.21, ts = .89, .47, -.63, and -1.13, and ps = .38, .64, .53, and .26, respectively.
However, there was a significant, positive correlation between the concern for
Because the results in Study 2
sugge
hoc analysis exploring this relationship in this study.
Consistent with the finding in Study 2, the post hoc analysis suggests that the effect of the
s was statistically
significant, Exp(B) = 1.58, p = .008. This suggests that for one unit increase in the
58 times increase in the odds of an ethical
decision.
As another exploratory analysis, I also ran regressions in which the concern for
self and emotion were the dependent variables, respectively, and mode of thought,
framing, and their interaction were the predictors. There was no evidence that the concern
for self or emotion was predicted by mode of thought, framing, or their interaction. As a
whole, results in Study 3a did not provide empirical support for the prediction that
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intuition is less likely to re
possibly due to the failed manipulation of framing. Because the dependent variable in
remained unclear whether intuition would be less likely to result in ethical decisions
decision. Therefore, Study 3b was designed to test this possibility, which also is the full
model specified in H3.
2.3.2 Study 3b
2.3.2.1 Method
An a priori power analysis was performed using GPower 3.1 to estimate the
sample size. The following parameters were used in the calculation of sample size: effect
size (f) = .25, power = .8, numerator df = 1, and number of groups = 4. The sample size
based on this power analysis was 128. I recruited about 15% more participants for the
same reason I did in previous studies. The final sample size was 141.
One hundred forty-one undergraduate students enrolled in Management classes at
the University of Utah were recruited to participate in this study in exchange for partial
course credit (plus a cash payment based on their decisions in the task). There were 55
women and 86 men, with a mean age of 23.40 (SD = 4.14). In terms of ethnicity, the
sample was 63.1% White/European American, 22.0% Asian/Asian American, 2.8%
Black/African American, 5.7% Latino/Hispanic, 0.7% Native American, and 5.7% other
ethnicities. At the time of the study, 71.6% of the participants were employed. Ninety-
eight participants (69.5%) spoke English as their native language. Ninety-five
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participants (67.4%) were from the United States.
Participants were asked to complete the same decision making task used in Study
3a (see Appendix G). A 2 (mode of thought: intuition vs. deliberation) × 2 (framing:
business vs. nonbusiness) between-participants design was used in this study. Participants
were randomly assigned to one of four conditions. In the intuition condition, participants
read the following instruction: Base your decision entirely on your intuition or first
impression, and avoid thinking very hard. You must make your decision in less than 14
seconds (Dane et al., 2012; Rand et al., 2012). In the deliberation condition, participants
read the following instruction: Base your decision on a very careful analysis and ignore
any first impression or gut instinct that might arise. You must wait and think for at least
15 seconds (see Appendix G)
on the screen after 15 seconds had passed (Dane et al., 2012; Rand et al., 2012). Both 14
seconds in the intuition condition and 15 seconds in the deliberation condition were
determined based on the timing data collected in Study 1a. The manipulation of business
framing (vs. nonbusiness framing) was the same as Study 3a (see Appendix G). In Study
3b, I also tested the full model specified in Hypothesis 3.
After completing the t measure,
participants answered questions about the task (see Appendix G), other measures (see
Appendix B), and demographics questions (see Appendix C). Like in the previous studies,
participants were asked to indicate the extent to which they thought that the Decision
Maker would believe them, sending the false message to the Decision Maker is an
explicit lie, and sending the false message to the Decision Maker is unethical. These
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ethical decision making contexts (Gunia et al., 2012; Zhong, 2011) and therefore need to
be controlled for if they are significantly correl
dependent variable. I measured individual difference variables to potentially control for
them in the analyses and to explore their potential moderating effects.
2.3.2.2 Results and Discussion
In the task, I asked the participants to confirm the role to which they were
assigned, to indicate how much money they would earn if the decision maker believed
them, to report whether they had done the same decision making task before, to report
whether they had taken the management class before, to indicate what they thought the
purpose of the study was, and to answer two attention-check questions so that I could run
the analyses both with and without those who did not pay enough attention, had done the
exact decision making task before, had taken the management class before, and/or
guessed the purpose of the study. The data indicate that five participants (3.5%) did not
select Message Sender as their role in the task, 13 participants (9.2%) did not identify the
correct amount of money they would earn in the task, four participants (2.8%) had done
the same task before, 34 participants (24.1%) had taken the management class before, no
participants guessed the purpose of the study, 25 participants (17.7%) did not answer the
first attention check question correctly, and 20 participants (14.2%) did not answer the
second attention check question correctly. Excluding these participants both separately
and together did not change the study results, so I report the results for the full sample (n
= 141).
an open-ended question about why they
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chose to send the message they did. Similar to Studies 1a, 2, and 3a, for those who told
the truth, many said that they sent the truthful message for honesty and/or fairness
reasons. For those who lied, many mentioned that they wanted to get more money for
themselves.
As a manipulation check, I first examined whether participants in the intuition
(deliberation) condition reported relying on intuition (deliberation) to make their
decisions more than those in the deliberation (intuition) condition. On average,
participants in the intuition condition (Mintuition = 4.64, SD = 1.46) did not agree with the
I used intuition or gu
deliberation condition (Mdeliberation = 4.21, SD = 1.76), t(139) = 1.58, p = .116. On average,
participants in the deliberation condition (Mdeliberation = 4.97, SD = 1.28) agreed with the
I used a caref
condition (Mintuition = 4.49, SD = 1.78), but only marginally, t(139) = 1.86, p = .07. This
suggests the manipulation of intuition and deliberation was not as effective as the
previous studies. Because the manipulation of intuition in Study 3b was the same as
Studies 2 and 3a, one potential reason for its ineffectiveness is that participants in this
study did not pay as much attention to the instruction regarding intuition (vs. deliberation)
as those in the previous studies. Next, I examined whether participants in the business
framing (nonbusiness framing) condition reported the decision making task to be a
business transaction (social exchange) more than those in the nonbusiness framing
(business framing) condition. On average, participants in the business framing condition
(Mbusiness = 5.32, SD ion making task was a
Mnon-business =
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4.89, SD = 1.66), but only marginally, t(139) = 1.73, p = .09. On average, participants in
the nonbusiness framing condition (Mnon-business = 4.50, SD = 1.64) did not agree with the
business framing condition (Mbusiness = 4.28, SD = 1.59), t(139) = .80, p = .42. This
suggests the manipulation of business and nonbusiness framing was not effective. Due to
the ineffectiveness of the manipulations of both mode of thought and framing, the results
of this study need to be interpreted with extreme caution.
Descriptive statistics and correlations among study variables are listed in Table 6.
For those in the intuition condition, 19 participants (51%) exposed to a business framing
made an unethical decision and 15 participants (45%) exposed to a nonbusiness framing
made an unethical decision. For those in the deliberation condition, 18 participants (53%)
exposed to a business framing made an unethical decision and 17 participants (46%)
exposed to a nonbusiness framing made an unethical decision. The concern for the
= .63). The concern
for the self was assessed through another set of four items ( = .76).
To test Hypothesis 3, I conducted a moderated mediation analysis using a
bootstrapping approach (Preacher & Hayes, 2004) comparing mode of thought
(deliberation = 0, intuition = 1) as the independent variable, the framing of the decision
making context as the moderator (business = 0; nonbusiness = 1), and the decision to
behave unethically (i.e., lie in the decision making task) as a dichotomous dependent
variable (unethical = 0, ethical = 1). Specifically, employing the bootstrapping method
produced a confidence interval (CI) of [-.864, .355] for the moderated mediation. The
moderated mediation effect was not statistically significant because the CI includes zero
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(see Figure 2). Therefore, H3 was not supported.
To explore the potential moderating effects of individual differences, I also ran
four different logistic regressions to examine whether each of the four individual
difference variables (i.e., Faith in Intuition, Need for Cognition, Moral Identity, and
Moral Disengagement) interacts with mode of thought (i.e., intuition vs. deliberation) to
affect the ethicality of were statistically
significant, Exp(B)s = 1.47, .55, 1.71, and 1.31, and ps = .31, .11, .21, and .46,
respectively.
However, similar to Studies 2 and 3a, there was a significant, positive correlation
between the
(unethical = 0, ethical = 1). The
s was statistically significant, Exp(B) = 2.02, p = .000. This suggests that
s a 2.02 times increase
in the odds of an ethical decision. Additional moderated mediation analyses using the
same bootstrapping approach (Preacher & Hayes, 2004) suggest that neither concern for
the self nor emotion mediated the relationship between mode of thought (i.e., intuition vs.




I conducted another study on Amazon Mechanical Turk to test Hypothesis 3 and
rule out the possibility that nonsignificant results in Study 3b were due to the failed
manipulations of mode of thought and framing. First, I pilot tested alternative
manipulations of both framing and mode of thought to make sure that they work. I pilot
tested one alternative way of manipulating business versus nonbusiness framing and four
alternative ways to manipulate intuition versus deliberation. I recruited 40 participants on
Amazon Mechanical Turk for each of the four combinations for manipulating framing
and mode of thought. The variations in these combinations occurred only in the
manipulation of mode of thought, as the manipulation of framing was the same across the
four pilots (see Appendix H).
Participants were asked to engage in the same decision making task used in Study
3a, but the manipulations of the independent variable and moderator were different (see
Appendix H). A 2 (mode of thought: intuition vs. deliberation) × 2 (framing: business vs.
nonbusiness) between-participants design was used in this study. Participants were
randomly assigned to one of four conditions. Participants in the business framing
condition were asked to engage in a hypothetical business transaction with the other party,
whereas those in the nonbusiness framing condition were asked to engage in a
hypothetical task with the other participant. Pilot data showed that this method for
manipulating business versus nonbusiness framing was effective. On a 5-point Likert-
type scale, participants in the business framing condition (Mbusiness = 4.67, SD = .48)
agreed that the task they had completed was a business transaction more than those in the
nonbusiness framing condition (Mnon-business = 3.90, SD = 1.02), t(39) = 3.10, p = .00.
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Among the four alternative ways of manipulating intuition versus deliberation,
one manipulation worked (see Appendix H). Participants in the intuition (deliberation)
condition were told that the researchers were interested in how people use intuition (vs. a
careful analysis) to make their decisions and were later asked which message their
intuition (vs. careful analysis) told them to send. In addition, participants in the
deliberation condition were asked to think carefully about which message they would like
to send for 3 minutes ( only appeared after 3 minutes had passed),
whereas participants in the intuition condition did not receive this instruction. On a 5-
point Likert-type scale, participants in the intuition condition (Mintuition = 3.95, SD = .87)
agreed that their choice was based on their intuition or gut instinct more than those in the
deliberation condition (Mdeliberation = 3.05, SD = 1.36), t(39) = 2.55, p = .02.
2.3.3.1 Method
After demonstrating the effectiveness of an alternative way of manipulating mode
of thought (i.e., intuition vs. deliberation) and framing (i.e., business vs. nonbusiness), I
conducted Study 3c to test Hypothesis 3 and rule out the possibility that nonsignificant
results in Study 3b were due to the failed manipulations. An a priori power analysis was
performed using GPower 3.1 to estimate the sample size. The following parameters were
used in the calculation of sample size: effect size (f) = .25, power = .8, and number of
groups = 2. The sample size based on this power analysis was 128. I recruited 15% more
participants for the same reason I did in previous studies. The final sample size was 148.
One hundred forty-eight adults in the United States were recruited through the
Amazon Mechanical Turk, an online participant pool (Buhrmester et al., 2011), to
56
participate in this study for 50 cents. There were 75 women and 73 men, with a mean age
of 36.70 (SD = 12.38). In terms of ethnicity, the sample was 76.4% White/European
American, 7.4% Asian/Asian American, 5.4% Black/African American, 8.8%
Latino/Hispanic, 0.7% Native American, and 1.4% other ethnicities. At the time of the
study, 76.4% of the participants were employed. One hundred forty-seven participants
(99.3%) spoke English as their native language. One hundred forty-eight participants
(100%) were from the United States.
Participants were asked to complete the same hypothetical task used in the
previous pilot (i.e., the hypothetical Gneezy task). The manipulations of mode of thought
and framing were the same as those used in the previous pilot in which both
manipulations worked (see Appendix H).
2.3.3.2 Results and Discussion
In the task, I asked the participants to report whether they had done the same
decision making task before, to indicate what they thought the purpose of the study was,
and answer an attention-check question so that I could run the analyses both with and
without those who did not pay enough attention, had done the exact decision making task
before, and/or guessed the purpose of the study. The data indicate that 10 participants
(6.8%) had done the same task before, no participants guessed the purpose of the study,
and 10 participants (6.8%) did not answer the attention-check question correctly.
Excluding these participants both separately and together did not change the study results,
so I report the results for the full sample (n = 148).
The data showed that the manipulations of mode of thought and framing were
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again effective in Study 3c. On a 5-point Likert-type scale, participants in the business
framing condition (Mbusiness = 4.73, SD = .45) agreed that the task they had completed was
a business transaction more than those in the nonbusiness framing condition (Mnon-business
= 3.97, SD = 1.13), t(146) = 5.34, p = .00. On a 5-point Likert-type scale, participants in
the intuition condition (Mintuition = 4.11, SD = .88) agreed that their choice was based on
their intuition or gut instinct more than those in the deliberation condition (Mdeliberation =
2.86, SD = 1.38), t(146) = 6.55, p = .00.
Descriptive statistics and correlations among study variables are listed in Table 7.
For those in the intuition condition, 15 participants (42%) exposed to a business framing
made an unethical decision and 21 participants (58%) exposed to a nonbusiness framing
made an unethical decision. For those in the deliberation condition, 21 participants (55%)
exposed to a business framing made an unethical decision and 10 participants (26%)
exposed to a nonbusiness framing made an unethical decision.
As I did in Study 3b, I conducted a moderated mediation analysis using a
bootstrapping approach (Preacher & Hayes, 2004) comparing mode of thought as the
independent variable, the framing of the decision making context as the moderator, and
the decision to send the false message in the task as a dichotomous dependent variable.
Employing the bootstrapping method produced a confidence interval (CI) of [-1.137, .059]
for the moderated mediation. The moderated mediation effect was not statistically
significant because the CI includes zero (see Figure 3). Therefore, H3 was not supported.




statistically significant, Exp(B) = 1.77, p = .000. This suggests that for a 1-unit increase
in the concern for oth times increase in the odds of an
ethical decision. Additional moderated mediation analyses using the same bootstrapping
approach (Preacher & Hayes, 2004) suggest that neither concern for the self nor emotion
mediated the relationship between mode of thought, framing of the decision making
The results of this study suggest that
previous nonsignificant results were less likely due to the ineffective manipulations of
mode of thought (i.e., intuition vs. deliberation) and framing (i.e., business vs.







Table 5. Regression Analysis Examining Framing as a Moderator (Study 3a).
Dependent Variable
Variables B t
Mode of Thought 0.04 0.28
Framing 0.01 0.08
Mode x Framing -0.14 -0.39
Model R2 0.002




Note. N = 149. All values are unstandardized regression coefficients. The value in parentheses represents
the coefficient before the mediator was included in the model.
Figure 1. The Mediation Model (Study 2).
Note. N = 141. All values are unstandardized regression coefficients.
Figure 2. The Moderated Mediation Model (Study 3b).















Note. N = 148. All values are unstandardized regression coefficients.












GENERAL DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION
As a mode of thought and information processing strategy, intuition plays an
important role in problem solving and decision making (Betsch, 2008; Dane & Pratt,
2007). Drawing on research on prosociality and framing, I hypothesized that intuitive
decisions were generally more ethical than deliberative ones because people have a
ethical decisions under the condition of business framing because business framing
attenuates the effect of intuit
examined the relationships among mode of thought (i.e., intuition vs. deliberation),
framing of the decision making context (i.e., business vs. nonbusiness), the concern for
Results across the studies did not
provide empirical support for the hypotheses.
To better understand the relationship between intuition and ethical decision
making, it is important to acknowledge the limitations of the research presented here and
point out directions for future research that may yield more conclusive findings. First, as
demonstrated in both prior and current research, it is methodologically challenging to
study intuition due to the quickness with which it influences decision making. An
intuitive decision is usually made within a small amount of time, arguably a second or
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two (Haidt & Joseph, 2004). Any additional time in a decision making process could be
used to analyze and even override the intuitive decision already made. This means that
the decision of whether or not to lie in the task may have already changed by the time
participants in the intuition condition submit their decisions. This methodological
challenge is unlikely to be solved easily under the current survey research paradigm.
More interdisciplinary research is needed in the future in which research on intuition and
ethical decision making may be incorporated in imaging (e.g., MRI) studies in order to
pinpoint an intuitive decision as it is being made.
Second, in terms of theorizing, this research was conducted to test a specific
theoretical model that did not incorporate other potentially relevant variables, both
individual and contextual, due to its limited scope. The nonsignificant results across the
studies suggest that it is useful to consider the possibility that the relationship between
intuition and ethical decision making may depend upon individual and contextual factors
other than the proposed moderator in this research (i.e., framing). Future research should
examine the potential effects of intuition on ethical decision making by incorporating
additional individual and contextual variables in the theoretical model and empirically
testing the relationships among these variables.
the hypothesized relationship between
Specifically, data across three originally proposed studies and Study 3c suggest that the
interests is positively associated with ethical decisions. In Study 2, I
found that for a 1-
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increase in the odds of an ethical decision (i.e., telling the truth in a decision making task).
In Study 3a, a post hoc analysis suggested that for a 1-unit increase in the concern for
Study 3b, I found that for a 1-unit increase in the concern for other
2.02 times increase in the odds of an ethical decision. In Study 3c, I found that for a 1-
odds of an ethical decision. The incidental yet converging evidence suggests that
than when it is low. Because of this incidental finding, a potential direction for future
research could focus on identifying the ant
which is conceptualized in this theoretical model as a state variable in the process of
ethical decision making, in order to examine whether they interact with intuition to affect
ions.
integral part of moral character (Cohen & Morse, 2014; Cohen, Panter, Turan, Morse, &
Kim, 2014). Conceptualized as an individual difference, the concern for others can
motivate decision makers to potentially
making decisions and, as a consequence, behave ethically (Cohen & Morse, 2014). This
perspective is consistent with the virtue theories of ethics, in which virtues are often seen
as traits and characteristics of an individual that can potentially increase his or her
sensitivity to the moral aspects of a situation, such as the well-being of others (Haidt &
Joseph, 2004).
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interests into consideration when they make decisions with ethical implications.
Related to the idea of examining how individual differences might influence
intuitive (vs. deliberative) ethical decision making, I explored the potential moderating
effects of individual differences, including the propensity to morally disengage, in the
first five studies. Past research shows that individuals differ in their propensity to morally
disengage or the degree to which morally relevant decisions are cognitively processed in
a manner that allows individuals to behave unethically without experiencing distress
(Moore et al., 2012). In Study 1b, in which participants responded to a hiring scenario, I
found that individuals who are low (high) in the propensity to morally disengage were
more likely to make an ethical decision when using intuition (deliberation) than when
using deliberation (intuition). This incidental finding suggests that the relationship
decisions may depend on an individual difference variable. However, the fact that this
effect was not found in the other studies in which participants completed the Gneezy task
as opposed to the hiring scenario suggests that this effect may depend on the task/type of
decision or that other individual differences may play a more important role in intuitive
(vs. deliberative) decision making.
For instance, as the motivational element of moral character (Cohen & Morse,
2014) individual differences such as the
propensity to morally disengage in that it specifically reflects to the
well-being of others when making decisions. Future research could examine whether
intuition influences people with different levels of moral character differently in the
context of ethical decision making. It is possible that intuition may lead individuals with
72
a high level of moral character to make ethical decisions because they are predisposed to
consider the well-being of others when making decisions (Cohen & Morse, 2014),
whereas deliberation might potentially benefit those with a low level of moral character
in ethical decision making because a slow reasoning process could potentially render the
moral aspects of the decision making context more salient to them. Theoretically
speaking, both intuition for those with a high level of moral character and deliberation for
those with a low level of moral character
interests, which is conceptualized as a state variable in the ethical decision making
process and in turn could result in ethical decisions.
Another possible antecedent
which refers to the prevailing perceptions of what constitutes ethical practices and
procedures at work (Treviño, den Nieuwenboer, & Kish-Gephart, 2014; Victor & Cullen,
1988). In reviewing the literature on unethical behavior at work and its antecedents,
Treviño and colleagues (2014) found that whereas a self-interested or egoistic climate is
positively associated with the consideration of self-interest and an unethical choice, a
caring or principled climate is positively associated with the concern for others and an
ethical choice (Kish-Gephart, Harrison, & Treviño, 2010; Martin & Cullen, 2006; Simha
& Cullen, 2012). Future research can examine whether intuition may potentially
influence people who are in different types of climate (e.g., self-interested vs. principled)
differently in the context of ethical decision making. It is possible that individuals in a
principled climate may intuitively make ethical decisions because an emphasis on ethical
principles in the environment may render an ethical choice a default for them, whereas
those in a self-interested climate could potentially benefit from a deliberative process in
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ethical decision making because it might help them overcome their default, which might
be the opposite (i.e., an unethical choice) in this case, given the emphasis on self-interest
in the environment.
In sum, the nonsignificant results in the current research regarding the role of
intuition in ethical decision making suggest that it is most likely the case, based on the
inconsistent findings in the literatures on intuition and ethical decision making, that the
relationship between intuition and decision ethicality is inherently complex. Future
research should take this complexity into consideration and design and test more nuanced
theoretical models. For instance, the significant, positive association between the concern
tablished in this research
suggests that future research could focus on identifying the antecedents of the concern for
interact with intuition to affect the ethicality of If they do, it could
explain why the hypothesized effects of intuition on ethical decision making did not
receive empirical support in the studies reported here, namely, that the hypothesized main
effects of intuition may have been suppressed by potential crossover interactions between
intuition and the antecedents
ethical climate).
Intuition plays an indispensable role in problem solving and decision making for
individuals, organizations, and societies alike. In the ethical realm, intuition can lead
people to behave ethically, but very little is known about when intuition leads to ethical
outcomes and why. With this dissertation, I intended to contribute to a better
understanding of the influence of intuition on ethical decision making. In five studies, I
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is hypothesized to
mediate the relationship b
framing of the decision making context is hypothesized to moderate it. Data across these
studies did not provide empirical support for my hypotheses. Incidentally, I found
consistent empirical evidence across three originally proposed studies and an additional
study
Given the inconsistent findings regarding the role of intuition in ethical decision making
in the literature (Gunia et al., 2012; Zhong, 2011) and the nonsignificant results in the
studies reported here, it remains unclear when intuition leads to ethical outcomes and
why. Future research needs to build on the incidental yet potentially important finding




Here the study materials are presented as participants saw them.  The lines indicate page
breaks in the online survey.  After reading the consent cover letter, participants engaged
in the decision making task.
Please complete the following decision making task. Read the instructions
carefully to ensure that you understand how the task works.
You will be given the opportunity to receive extra money based on the decisions
that you and another randomly assigned participant will make in this task. You
will be randomly, and virtually, paired with another participant.
No one will ever know the identity of the person with whom he or she is matched.
message sender
decision maker ontinue to be randomly assigned to
a role.
__________________________________________________________________
This may take a few seconds





There are two possible monetary payments available in this task:
ual payments are for
payment options.
__________________________________________________________________




The table below displays the payment options. Remember, only the Message
Sender (you) will be able to see what the actual payment options are. The
Decision Maker will simply be asked to select Option A or Option B after
receiving your message. The option they select will determine your own payment.
Payment Options Option A Option B
Message Sender will receive... $3 $1
Decision Maker will receive... $1 $3
Keep in mind that you will receive the money at the end of the session.
__________________________________________________________________
At this point participants in the intuition and deliberation conditions were given different




Base your decision entirely on your intuition or first impression, and avoid
thinking very hard.
Deliberation Condition
Base your decision on a very careful analysis and ignore any first impression
or gut instinct that might arise.
__________________________________________________________________
paid at the end of the session.
__________________________________________________________________
answer the following questions before we communicate to you the outcome for y
second item served as a manipulation check.
et al., 2012)
_________________________________________________________________
Please rate the extent to which you agree with the following statements.
a) I used intuition or gut instincts to make my decision. (Dane et al., 2012)
1 = Strongly Disagree; 7 = Strongly Agree
b) I used a careful analysis to make my decision. (Dane et al., 2012)






When deciding which message to send, I expected the Decision Maker to believe
me. (Gunia et al., 2012)
1 = Strongly Disagree; 5 = Strongly Agree
_________________________________________________________________
1 = Strongly Disagree; 5 = Strongly Agree
_________________________________________________________________
1 = Strongly Disagree; 5 = Strongly Agree
_________________________________________________________________
or $3 according to the message they chose to send. They were asked to indicate their
They then completed the following scales: faith in intuition (Epstein et al., 1996), need
for cognition (Epstein et al., 1996), propensity to morally disengage (Moore et al., 2012),
and moral identity (Aquino & Reed, 2002). The first attention check question was
imbedded within the items for moral identity. See Appendix C for the items.
Next, participants were asked the following questions:




Finally, participants Thank you. You are almost finished. Please answer
the demographic questions that follow, and your study session will then be over.
answered demographics questions, one of which was the second attention check question




Faith in Intuition (Epstein et al., 1996)
The following items are measured on a 7-point Likert scale ranging from strongly
disagree = 1 to strongly agree = 7.
1. I trust my initial feelings about people.
2. I believe in trusting my hunches.
3. My initial impressions of people are almost always right.
4. When it comes to trusting people, I can usually rely on my "gut feelings."
5. I can usually feel when a person is right or wrong even if I can't explain how I
know.
Moral Identity (Aquino & Reed, 2002)
The following items are measured on a 5-point Likert scale ranging from strongly
disagree = 1 to strongly agree = 5.










The person with these characteristics could be you or it could be someone else. For a
moment, visualize in your mind the kind of person who has these characteristics. Imagine
how that person would think, feel, and act. When you have a clear image of what this
person would be like, answer the following questions:
1. It would make me feel good to be a person who has these characteristics.
2. Being someone who has these characteristics is an important part of who I am.
80
3. I often wear clothes that identify me as having these characteristics.
4. I would be ashamed to be a person who had these characteristics. (R)
5. The types of things I do in my spare time (e.g., hobbies) clearly identify me as
having these characteristics.
6. The kinds of books and magazines that I read identify me as having these
characteristics.
7. Having these characteristics is not really important to me. (R)
8. The fact that I have these characteristics is communicated to others by my
membership in certain organizations.
9. I am actively involved in activities that communicate to others that I have these
characteristics.
10. I strongly desire to have these characteristics.
11. As an attention check, please answer this question with "Somewhat disagree."
Need for Cognition (Epstein et al., 1996)
The following items are measured on a 7-point Likert scale ranging from strongly
disagree = 1 to strongly agree = 7.
1. I don't like to have to do a lot of thinking. (R)
2. I try to avoid situations that require thinking in depth about something. (R)
3. I prefer to do something that challenges my thinking abilities rather than
something that requires little thought.
4. I prefer complex to simple problems.
5. Thinking hard and for a long time about something gives me little satisfaction. (R)
Propensity to Morally Disengage Scale (Moore et al., 2012)
The following items are measured on a 7-point Likert scale ranging from strongly
disagree = 1 to strongly agree = 7.
1. It is okay to spread rumors to defend those you care about.
2. It is alright to lie to keep your friends out of trouble.




6. nt, not telling the whole story is
just part of the game.
7.
inflate your own credentials a bit.
8. Compared to other illegal things people do, taking something small from a store




were just doing what an authority figure told them to do.
11. People cannot be blamed for misbehaving if their friends pressured them to do it.
12.
do by their leaders.
13. cally wrong when all their




16. Taking personal credit for ideas that were not your own is no big deal.
17.
18. It is OK to tell small lies when negotiating because no one gets hurt.
19. Some people have to be treated roughly because they lack feelings that can be
hurt.
20. kay to treat badly somebody who behaves like scum.
21.
22. People who get mistreated have usually done something to bring it on themselves.
23. If a business makes a billing mistake in your favor,
it because it was their fault.
24.




1. Are you currently employed?
a. Yes
b. No
2. What is your gender?
a. Male
b. Female
3. What is your age? _________
4. This is an attention check question. To demonstrate that you are paying attention
and reading carefully, please enter the number '7' in the box below (included only
in Studies 1a, 1b, and 2).






f. Other (please specify): _______
6. Is English your native language?
a. Yes
b. No
7. Which country are you from?
a. United States




Here the study materials are presented as participants saw them.  The lines indicate page
breaks in the online survey.  After reading the consent cover letter, participants engaged
in the hiring decision task.
Please read through the following scenario and make a decision on the next page.
You were appointed as managing director in your company two months ago. You
are responsible for recruiting new hires. The time has come to recruit a new
assistant marketing manager. As a general rule, assistant managers need to be
responsible, confident in their skills, and have prior experience.
During the recruitment procedure, you received a number of satisfactory job
applications. You are interviewing a candidate who appears to be qualified for the
job. When the interview is finished, you still have a few minutes left and you ask
the candidate what he can do for your company that someone else cannot. In
response, the candidate implies that if you hire him he would provide your
company with confidential information on your main competitor.
__________________________________________________________________
At this point participants in the intuition and deliberation conditions were given different
instructions and then they indicated the likelihood that they would hire the candidate.
The likelihood that they would hire the candidate for the job was the dependent variable.
Intuition Condition
How likely would you be to hire this candidate for the job?
Base your decision entirely on your intuition or first impression, and avoid
thinking very hard. You must make your decision in less than 9 seconds.




4 = Somewhat likely
5
6
7 = Very likely
Here participants also saw a timer that counts down from 9.
Deliberation Condition
How likely would you be to hire this candidate for the job?
Base your decision on a very careful analysis and ignore any first impression or
gut instinct that might arise. You must wait and think for at least 20 seconds
before making your decision.
1 = Not likely at all
2
3
4 = Somewhat likely
5
6
7 = Very likely
Here participants also saw a timer that counts
after 20 seconds have passed.
__________________________________________________________________
After completing the task, participants saw this
The first item served as a manipulation check.
Please rate the extent to which you agree with the following statements.
a) I used intuition or gut instincts to make my decision. (Dane et al., 2012)
1 = Strongly Disagree; 7 = Strongly Agree
b) I used a careful analysis to make my decision. (Dane et al., 2012)
1 = Strongly Disagree; 7 = Strongly Agree
__________________________________________________________________
Leaking confidential information is unethical.
1 = Strongly Disagree; 5 = Strongly Agree
__________________________________________________________________
Ne
then completed the following scales: faith in intuition (Epstein et al., 1996), need for
cognition (Epstein et al., 1996), propensity to morally disengage (Moore et al., 2012),
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and moral identity (Aquino & Reed, 2002). The first attention check question was
imbedded within the items for moral identity. See Appendix B for the items.
Next, participants were asked the following questions:
What do you think this study is
know.
_________________________________________________________________
Finally, participants Thank you. You are almost finished. Please answer
the demographic questions that follow, and your study session will then be over.
answered demographics questions, one of which was the second attention check question




Here the study materials are presented as participants saw them.  The lines indicate page
breaks in the online survey.  After reading the consent cover letter, participants engaged
in the decision making task.
Please complete the following decision making task. Read the instructions
carefully to ensure that you understand how the task works.
You will be given the opportunity to receive extra money based on the decisions
that you and another randomly assigned participant will make in this task. You
will be randomly, and virtually, paired with another participant.
No one will ever know the identity of the person with whom he or she is matched.
message sender
decision maker ontinue to be randomly assigned to
a role.
__________________________________________________________________
This may take a few seconds





There are two possible monetary payments available in this task:
) will choose between one of two messages
ts are for
ever see the monetary
payment options.
__________________________________________________________________




The table below displays the payme
sender (you) will be able to see what the actual payment options are. The
aker will simply be asked to select Option A or Option B after
receiving your message. The option he or she selects will determine your own
payment.
Payment Options Option A Option B
Message Sender will receive... $3 $1
Decision Maker will receive... $1 $3
Keep in mind that you will receive the money at the end of the session.
__________________________________________________________________
At this point participants in the intuition and deliberation conditions were given different




Base your decision entirely on your intuition or first impression, and avoid
thinking very hard. You must make your decision in less than 12 seconds.
Here participants also saw a timer that counts down from 12.
Deliberation Condition
Base your decision on a very careful analysis and ignore any first impression
or gut instinct that might arise. You must wait and think for at least 15
seconds before making your decision.
Here participants also saw a timer that counts button appears
after 15 seconds have passed.
__________________________________________________________________
paid at the end of the session.
__________________________________________________________________
answer the
third item served as a manipulation check. The first attention check question was
imbedded within the second item.
interests scale. Items e) through h) constitute the concern for the self scale.
et al., 2012)
_________________________________________________________________
Please rate the extent to which you agree with the following statements.
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a) The outcome of the Decision Maker is important to me.
1 = Strongly Disagree; 7 = Strongly Agree
b)
1 = Strongly Disagree; 7 = Strongly Agree
c)
1 = Strongly Disagree; 7 = Strongly Agree
d) My choice between the two messages was driven by the Decision
1 = Strongly Disagree; 7 = Strongly Agree
e) My outcome is important to me.
1 = Strongly Disagree; 7 = Strongly Agree
f) I want to make sure that my interest is taken care of.
1 = Strongly Disagree; 7 = Strongly Agree
g)
1 = Strongly Disagree; 7 = Strongly Agree
h) My choice between the two messages was driven by my expected payoff.
(Zhong, 2011)
1 = Strongly Disagree; 7 = Strongly Agree
i) When I was choosing between the two messages, my emotion did not
play any role. (R) (Zhong, 2011)
1 = Strongly Disagree; 7 = Strongly Agree
j) This is an attention check question. To demonstrate that you are paying
attention and reading carefully, please choose "somewhat agree".
_________________________________________________________________
Please rate the extent to which you agree with the following statements.
a) I used intuition or gut instincts to make my decision. (Dane et al., 2012)
1 = Strongly Disagree; 7 = Strongly Agree
b) I used a careful analysis to make my decision. (Dane et al., 2012)






When deciding which message to send, I expected the Decision Maker to believe
me. (Gunia et al., 2012)
1 = Strongly Disagree; 5 = Strongly Agree
_________________________________________________________________
1 = Strongly Disagree; 5 = Strongly Agree
_________________________________________________________________
1 = Strongly Disagree; 5 = Strongly Agree
_________________________________________________________________
unicate
or $3 according to the message they chose to send. They were asked to indicate their
proceed to the
They then completed the following scales: faith in intuition (Epstein et al., 1996), need
for cognition (Epstein et al., 1996), propensity to morally disengage (Moore et al., 2012),
and moral identity (Aquino & Reed, 2002). The second attention check question was
imbedded within the items for moral identity. See Appendix B for the items.
Next, participants were asked the following questions:
know.
_________________________________________________________________
Finally, participants Thank you. You are almost finished. Please answer
the demographic questions that follow, and your study session will then be over.
answered demographics questions, one of which was the third attention check question




Here the study materials are presented as participants saw them.  The lines indicate page
breaks in the online survey.  After reading the consent cover letter, participants engaged
in the decision making task. Participants in the business framing and nonbusiness
framing conditions read different descriptions of the same decision making task.
Business Framing Condition
In this study you will be engaging in a business transaction with another
participant currently logged into the system. Please read the instructions carefully
to ensure that you understand how this business transaction works.
You will be given the opportunity to receive real money based on the decisions
that you and another randomly assigned participant will make in this business
transaction. You will be randomly, and virtually, paired with another participant.
No one will ever know the identity of the person with whom he or she is matched.
be randomly assigned to
a role.
__________________________________________________________________
This may take a few seconds





There are two possible monetary payments available in this business transaction:








The table below displays the payment options in this business transaction.
ender (you) will be able to see what the actual
aker will simply be asked to select Option
A or Option B after receiving your message. The option he or she selects will
determine your own payment.
Payment Options Option A Option B
Message Sender will receive... $3 $1
Decision Maker will receive... $1 $3




In this study you will be engaging in a social exchange with another participant
currently logged into the system. Please read the instructions carefully to ensure
that you understand how this social exchange works.
You will be given the opportunity to receive real money based on the decisions
that you and another randomly assigned participant will make in this social
exchange. You will be randomly, and virtually, paired with another participant.




This may take a few seconds














The table below displays the payment options in this social exchange. Remember,
ender (you) will be able to see what the actual payment
n maker will simply be asked to select Option A or
Option B after receiving your message. The option he or she selects will
determine your own payment.
Payment Options Option A Option B
Message Sender will receive... $3 $1
Decision Maker will receive... $1 $3
Keep in mind that you will receive the money at the end of the session.
________________________________________________________________________
At this point participants in the intuition and deliberation conditions were given different
instructions.
Intuition Condition




Base your decision on a very careful analysis and ignore any first impression
or gut instinct that might arise.
________________________________________________________________________
concern for the self, and the role of emotion. The first attention check question was
im Items a)
interests scale. Items e) through h)
constitute the concern for the self scale.
Before sending your message to the "decision maker", please rate the extent to
which you agree with the following statements.
a) The outcome of the Decision Maker is important to me.
1 = Strongly Disagree; 7 = Strongly Agree
b)
1 = Strongly Disagree; 7 = Strongly Agree
c)
1 = Strongly Disagree; 7 = Strongly Agree
d) My choice between the two messages was driven by the Decision
1 = Strongly Disagree; 7 = Strongly Agree
e) My outcome is important to me.
1 = Strongly Disagree; 7 = Strongly Agree
f) I want to make sure that my interest is taken care of.
1 = Strongly Disagree; 7 = Strongly Agree
g)
1 = Strongly Disagree; 7 = Strongly Agree
h) My choice between the two messages was driven by my expected payoff.
(Zhong, 2011)
1 = Strongly Disagree; 7 = Strongly Agree
i) In choosing between the two messages, my emotion
important role. (R) (Zhong, 2011)
1 = Strongly Disagree; 7 = Strongly Agree
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j) This is an attention check question. To demonstrate that you are paying
attention and reading carefully, please choose "somewhat agree".
_________________________________________________________________
At this point participants in the intuition and deliberation conditions read different
instructions and then they chose which message to send to determine how much money
they would get paid.
Intuition Condition
Now which message would you like to send to
Base your decision entirely on your intuition or first impression, and avoid
thinking very hard. You must make your decision in less than 14 seconds.
Message
Here participants also saw a timer that counts down from 14.
Deliberation Condition
Now w
Base your decision on a very careful analysis and ignore any first impression
or gut instinct that might arise. You must wait and think for at least 15
seconds before making your decision.
Here participants also saw a timer that counts
after 15 seconds have passed.
__________________________________________________________________
Thank you. Your
paid at the end of the session.
__________________________________________________________________
answer the following questions before we communicate to you the outcome for yo




Please rate the extent to which you agree with the following statements.
a) I used intuition or gut instincts to make my decision. (Dane et al., 2012)
1 = Strongly Disagree; 7 = Strongly Agree
b) I used a careful analysis to make my decision. (Dane et al., 2012)
1 = Strongly Disagree; 7 = Strongly Agree
c) The decision making task was a business transaction.
1 = Strongly Disagree; 7 = Strongly Agree
d) The decision making task was a social exchange.





When deciding which message to send, I expected the Decision Maker to believe
me. (Gunia et al., 2012)
1 = Strongly Disagree; 5 = Strongly Agree
_________________________________________________________________
hong, 2011).
1 = Strongly Disagree; 5 = Strongly Agree
_________________________________________________________________
1 = Strongly Disagree; 5 = Strongly Agree
_________________________________________________________________
or $3 according to the message they chose to send. They were asked to indicate their
They then completed the following scales: faith in intuition (Epstein et al., 1996), need
for cognition (Epstein et al., 1996), propensity to morally disengage (Moore et al., 2012),
and moral identity (Aquino & Reed, 2002). The second attention check question was
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imbedded within the items for moral identity. See Appendix B for the items.
Next, participants were asked the following questions:
know.
_________________________________________________________________
Have you done this exact decision making task before?
Have you taken MGT 3680 before?
Finally, participants Thank you. You are almost finished. Please answer
the demographic questions that follow, and your study session will then be over.





Here the study materials are presented as participants saw them.  The lines indicate page
breaks in the online survey.  After reading the consent cover letter, participants engaged
in the decision making task. Participants in the business framing and non-business
framing conditions read different descriptions of the same decision making task.
Business Framing Condition
In this study you will be engaging in a business transaction with another
participant currently logged into the system. Please read the instructions carefully
to ensure that you understand how this business transaction works.
You will be given the opportunity to receive real money based on the decisions
that you and another randomly assigned participant will make in this business
transaction. You will be randomly, and virtually, paired with another participant.
No one will ever know the identity of the person with whom he or she is matched.
a role.
__________________________________________________________________
This may take a few seconds














The table below displays the payment options in this business transaction.
ender (you) will be able to see what the actual
aker will simply be asked to select Option
A or Option B after receiving your message. The option he or she selects will
determine your own payment.
Payment Options Option A Option B
Message Sender will receive... $3 $1
Decision Maker will receive... $1 $3




In this study you will be engaging in a social exchange with another participant
currently logged into the system. Please read the instructions carefully to ensure
that you understand how this social exchange works.
You will be given the opportunity to receive real money based on the decisions
that you and another randomly assigned participant will make in this social
exchange. You will be randomly, and virtually, paired with another participant.
No one will ever know the identity of the person with whom he or she is matched.
f you will be
a role.
__________________________________________________________________
This may take a few seconds














The table below displays the payment options in this social exchange. Remember,
ender (you) will be able to see what the actual payment
maker will simply be asked to select Option A or
Option B after receiving your message. The option he or she selects will
determine your own payment.
Payment Options Option A Option B
Message Sender will receive... $3 $1
Decision Maker will receive... $1 $3
Keep in mind that you will receive the money at the end of the session.
________________________________________________________________________
At this point participants in the intuition and deliberation conditions were given different




Base your decision entirely on your intuition or first impression, and avoid
thinking very hard. You must make your decision in less than 14 seconds.




Base your decision on a very careful analysis and ignore any first impression
or gut instinct that might arise. You must wait and think for at least 15
seconds before making your decision.
Here participants also saw a timer that counts
after 15 seconds have passed.
__________________________________________________________________
paid at the end of the session.
__________________________________________________________________
answer the following questions before we communicate to you the outcome for yo
third item served as a manipulation check. The first attention check question was
imbedded within the second item.
interests scale. Items e) through h) constitute the concern for the self scale.
et al., 2012)
_________________________________________________________________
Please rate the extent to which you agree with the following statements.
a) The outcome of the Decision Maker is important to me.
1 = Strongly Disagree; 7 = Strongly Agree
b)
1 = Strongly Disagree; 7 = Strongly Agree
c) me. (R)
1 = Strongly Disagree; 7 = Strongly Agree
d) My choice between the two messages was driven by the Decision
1 = Strongly Disagree; 7 = Strongly Agree
e) My outcome is important to me.
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1 = Strongly Disagree; 7 = Strongly Agree
f) I want to make sure that my interest is taken care of.
1 = Strongly Disagree; 7 = Strongly Agree
g)
1 = Strongly Disagree; 7 = Strongly Agree
h) My choice between the two messages was driven by my expected payoff.
(Zhong, 2011)
1 = Strongly Disagree; 7 = Strongly Agree
i) When I was choosing between the two messages, my emotion did not
play any role. (R) (Zhong, 2011)
1 = Strongly Disagree; 7 = Strongly Agree
j) This is an attention check question. To demonstrate that you are paying
attention and reading carefully, please choose "somewhat agree".
_________________________________________________________________
Please rate the extent to which you agree with the following statements.
a) I used intuition or gut instincts to make my decision. (Dane et al., 2012)
1 = Strongly Disagree; 7 = Strongly Agree
b) I used a careful analysis to make my decision. (Dane et al., 2012)
1 = Strongly Disagree; 7 = Strongly Agree
c) The decision making task was a business transaction.
1 = Strongly Disagree; 7 = Strongly Agree
d) The decision making task was a social exchange.






When deciding which message to send, I expected the Decision Maker to believe
me. (Gunia et al., 2012)
1 = Strongly Disagree; 5 = Strongly Agree
_________________________________________________________________
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1 = Strongly Disagree; 5 = Strongly Agree
_________________________________________________________________
1 = Strongly Disagree; 5 = Strongly Agree
_________________________________________________________________
or $3 according to the message they chose to send. They were asked to indicate their
They then completed the following scales: faith in intuition (Epstein et al., 1996), need
for cognition (Epstein et al., 1996), propensity to morally disengage (Moore et al., 2012),
and moral identity (Aquino & Reed, 2002). The second attention check question was
imbedded within the items for moral identity. See Appendix B for the items.
Next, participants were asked the following questions:
know.
_________________________________________________________________
Have you done this exact decision making task before?
Have you taken MGT 3680 before?
Finally, participants Thank you. You are almost finished. Please answer
the demographic questions that follow, and your study session will then be over.





Here the study materials are presented as participants saw them.  The lines indicate page
breaks in the online survey.  After reading the consent cover letter, participants were
randomly assigned to one of four conditions: intuition and business framing condition,
intuition and non-business framing condition, deliberation and business framing
condition, and deliberation and non-business framing condition. They were given
different instructions in the decision making task and then they chose which message to
send.  This decision was the dependent variable.
Intuition and Business Framing Condition
We are interested in how people use intuition to make decisions. You will be
engaging in a hypothetical business transaction with another party. Please
read the instructions carefully to ensure that you understand how this hypothetical
business transaction works.
__________________________________________________________________
Imagine that there are two parties in this hypothetical business transaction:
you and the other party.
Imagine that there are two possible monetary payments available in this
hypothetical business transaction:
Option A: $3 to you and $1 to the other party
Option B: $1 to you and $3 to the other party
First, you will choose between one of two messages (which will be provided to
you later) to send to the other party.
The other party will then make a choice between option A and option B. However,
the other party in this hypothetical business transaction will not know what the
actual payments are for each option; the only information the other party will
have is the message sent by you.
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Again, imagine that the other party will not know the monetary payments
associated with each choice. Only you will ever see the monetary payment
options.
__________________________________________________________________
The table below displays the payment options in this hypothetical business
transaction. Remember, only you will be able to see what the actual payment
options are. The other party will simply be asked to select Option A or Option B
after receiving your message.
Payment Options Option A Option B
You receive... $3 $1
The other party will receive... $1 $3
Here are the possible messages that you can send to the other party.
Message 1: Option A earns you more than Option B.
Message 2: Option B earns you more than Option A.
__________________________________________________________________
Which message does your intuition or gut instinct tell you to send to the other
party in this hypothetical business transaction?
Message 1: Option A earns you more than Option B.
Message 2: Option B earns you more than Option A.
__________________________________________________________________
Intuition and Non-Business Framing Condition
We are interested in how people use intuition to make decisions. You will be
engaging in a hypothetical task with another participant. Please read the
instructions carefully to ensure that you understand how this hypothetical task
works.
__________________________________________________________________
Imagine that there are two participants in this hypothetical task: you and the
other participant.
Imagine that there are two possible monetary payments available in this
hypothetical task:
Option A: $3 to you and $1 to the other participant
Option B: $1 to you and $3 to the other participant
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First, you will choose between one of two messages (which will be provided to
you later) to send to the other participant.
The other participant will then make a choice between option A and option B.
However, the other participant in this hypothetical task will not know what the
actual payments are for each option; the only information the other participant
will have is the message sent by you.
Again, imagine that the other participant will not know the monetary payments
associated with each choice. Only you will ever see the monetary payment
options.
__________________________________________________________________
The table below displays the payment options in this hypothetical task.
Remember, only you will be able to see what the actual payment options are. The
other participant will simply be asked to select Option A or Option B after
receiving your message.
Payment Options Option A Option B
You receive... $3 $1
The other participant will receive... $1 $3
Here are the possible messages that you can send to the other participant.
Message 1: Option A earns you more than Option B.
Message 2: Option B earns you more than Option A.
__________________________________________________________________
Which message does your intuition or gut instinct tell you to send to the other
participant in this hypothetical task?
Message 1: Option A earns you more than Option B.
Message 2: Option B earns you more than Option A.
________________________________________________________________________
Deliberation and Business Framing Condition
We are interested in how people use a careful analysis to make decisions. You
will be engaging in a hypothetical business transaction with another party.
Please read the instructions carefully to ensure that you understand how this
hypothetical business transaction works.
__________________________________________________________________
Imagine that there are two parties in this hypothetical business transaction:
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you and the other party.
Imagine that there are two possible monetary payments available in this
hypothetical business transaction:
Option A: $3 to you and $1 to the other party
Option B: $1 to you and $3 to the other party
First, you will choose between one of two messages (which will be provided to
you later) to send to the other party.
The other party will then make a choice between option A and option B. However,
the other party in this hypothetical business transaction will not know what the
actual payments are for each option; the only information the other party will
have is the message sent by you.
Again, imagine that the other party will not know the monetary payments
associated with each choice. Only you will ever see the monetary payment
options.
__________________________________________________________________
The table below displays the payment options in this hypothetical business
transaction. Remember, only you will be able to see what the actual payment
options are. The other party will simply be asked to select Option A or Option B
after receiving your message.
Payment Options Option A Option B
You receive... $3 $1
The other party will receive... $1 $3
Here are the possible messages that you can send to the other party.
Message 1: Option A earns you more than Option B.
Message 2: Option B earns you more than Option A.
__________________________________________________________________
Please think very carefully about which message to send in the next three
minutes.
Which message does your careful analysis tell you to send to the other party
in this hypothetical business transaction?
Message 1: Option A earns you more than Option B.
Message 2: Option B earns you more than Option A.
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Here participants also saw a timer that counts
button appears after three minutes have passed.
__________________________________________________________________
Deliberation and Non-Business Framing Condition
We are interested in how people use a careful analysis to make decisions. You
will be engaging in a hypothetical task with another participant. Please read
the instructions carefully to ensure that you understand how this hypothetical task
works.
__________________________________________________________________
Imagine that there are two participants in this hypothetical task: you and the
other participant.
Imagine that there are two possible monetary payments available in this
hypothetical task:
Option A: $3 to you and $1 to the other participant
Option B: $1 to you and $3 to the other participant
First, you will choose between one of two messages (which will be provided to
you later) to send to the other participant.
The other participant will then make a choice between option A and option B.
However, the other participant in this hypothetical task will not know what the
actual payments are for each option; the only information the other participant
will have is the message sent by you.
Again, imagine that the other participant will not know the monetary payments
associated with each choice. Only you will ever see the monetary payment
options.
__________________________________________________________________
The table below displays the payment options in this hypothetical task.
Remember, only you will be able to see what the actual payment options are. The
other participant will simply be asked to select Option A or Option B after
receiving your message.
Payment Options Option A Option B
You receive... $3 $1
The other participant will receive... $1 $3
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Here are the possible messages that you can send to the other participant.
Message 1: Option A earns you more than Option B.
Message 2: Option B earns you more than Option A.
__________________________________________________________________
Please think very carefully about which message to send in the next three
minutes.
Which message does your careful analysis tell you to send to the other
participant in this hypothetical task?
Message 1: Option A earns you more than Option B.
Message 2: Option B earns you more than Option A.
Here participants also saw a timer that counts
button appears after three minutes have passed.
__________________________________________________________________
After completing the task, participants answered manipulation check questions.
Thank you. Now please answer the following questions about the task you just
completed.
a) My choice between the two messages was based on my intuition or gut
instinct.
1 = Strongly Disagree; 5 = Strongly Agree
b) My choice between the two messages was based on a careful analysis.
1 = Strongly Disagree; 5 = Strongly Agree
c) The task I just completed was a hypothetical business transaction.
1 = Strongly Disagree; 5 = Strongly Agree
_________________________________________________________________
At this point participants in the business framing and nonbusiness framing conditions
were asked to rate slightly different items. In the business framing conditions, the other
-business framing conditions, the
imbedded here. interests scale.
Items e) through h) constitute the concern for the self scale.
Business Framing Condition
Please rate the extent to which you agree with the following statements.
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a) The outcome of the other party is important to me.
1 = Strongly Disagree; 7 = Strongly Agree
b) I want to make sure that the other party
1 = Strongly Disagree; 7 = Strongly Agree
c) How much money the other party
1 = Strongly Disagree; 7 = Strongly Agree
d) My choice between the two messages was driven by the other party
expected payoff.
1 = Strongly Disagree; 7 = Strongly Agree
e) My outcome is important to me.
1 = Strongly Disagree; 7 = Strongly Agree
f) I want to make sure that my interest is taken care of.
1 = Strongly Disagree; 7 = Strongly Agree
g)
1 = Strongly Disagree; 7 = Strongly Agree
h) My choice between the two messages was driven by my expected payoff.
(Zhong, 2011)
1 = Strongly Disagree; 7 = Strongly Agree
i) When I was choosing between the two messages, my emotion did not
play any role. (R) (Zhong, 2011)
1 = Strongly Disagree; 7 = Strongly Agree
j) As an attention check, please answer this question with "somewhat
disagree".
_________________________________________________________________
Sending the false message to the other party is an explicit lie (Zhong, 2011).
1 = Strongly Disagree; 5 = Strongly Agree
_________________________________________________________________
Sending the false message to the other party is unethical.





Have you done this exact decision making task before?
_________________________________________________________________
Non-Business Framing Condition
Please rate the extent to which you agree with the following statements.
a) The outcome of the other participant is important to me.
1 = Strongly Disagree; 7 = Strongly Agree
b) I want to make sure that the other participant
1 = Strongly Disagree; 7 = Strongly Agree
c) How much money the other participant
(R)
1 = Strongly Disagree; 7 = Strongly Agree
d) My choice between the two messages was driven by the other
participant
1 = Strongly Disagree; 7 = Strongly Agree
e) My outcome is important to me.
1 = Strongly Disagree; 7 = Strongly Agree
f) I want to make sure that my interest is taken care of.
1 = Strongly Disagree; 7 = Strongly Agree
g)
1 = Strongly Disagree; 7 = Strongly Agree
h) My choice between the two messages was driven by my expected payoff.
(Zhong, 2011)
1 = Strongly Disagree; 7 = Strongly Agree
i) When I was choosing between the two messages, my emotion did not
play any role. (R) (Zhong, 2011)
1 = Strongly Disagree; 7 = Strongly Agree
j) As an attention check, please answer this question with "somewhat
disagree".
_________________________________________________________________
Sending the false message to the other participant is an explicit lie (Zhong, 2011).
1 = Strongly Disagree; 5 = Strongly Agree
_________________________________________________________________
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Sending the false message to the other participant is unethical.




Have you done this exact decision making task before?
Finally, participants Thank you. You are almost finished. Please answer
the demographic questions that follow, and your study session will then be over.
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